

INTRODUCTION

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Peace to my countrymen; peace and Liberty.
From the great Senate of Imperial Rome,
With a firm league of amity, I come.
Rome, whate'er nation dare insult us more,
Will rouse, in our defence, her vet'ran pow'r,
And stretch her vengeful arm by land or sea,
'To curb the proud, and set the injur'd free.'¹

The above lines, from the recitative sung towards the end of Georg Friedrich Händel's oratorio *Judas Maccabaeus* (HWV 63, 1746) by the character of Eupolemus, the Maccabaeen ambassador to Rome in 161 BC,² beautifully illustrate how highly rated connections with the imperial power would have been by those peoples and states which were situated outside the Roman provinces, above all as a measure of security in an insecure world. A variety of modern terms is used to describe the dependent and quasi-independent kings, princes and other petty rulers in the Roman period, and all of them focus on specific aspects of their relationship with Rome: clients, vassals, allies, friends. Over the centuries, Rome had to face a continuously changing constellation of various social and political realities. In the Near East this constellation was particularly rich, so that Rome was engaged not just in warfare, but also in an intense diplomatic activity to affirm its control over it.³ Interstate *amicitiae* played a crucial role in the construction and maintenance of the empire, a role which

1 The Libretto is by Thomas Morell. Note also the German translation by Georg Gottfried Gervinus (1873):

Fried' über Juda, Fried' und Sicherheit!
Von dem Senate des gewaltgen Rom
Trag ich den festen Freundesbund euch an.
Rom, wenn sich wider uns ein Feind erhebt,
Steht auf zu unserm Schutz mit seiner Macht,
Uns schirmend mit dem Arm zu Land und See,
Des Frevlers Zaum, des Unterdrückten Hort.

2 Cf. *1 Makk.* 8:17–22, at 17: 'And Judas selected Eupolemos son of John son of Accos, and Jason son of Eleazar, and dispatched them to Rome to establish friendship and alliance' (καὶ ἐπελέξατο Ἰούδας τὸν Εὐπόλεμον υἱὸν Ἰωάννου τοῦ Ἀκκῶς καὶ Ἰάσονα υἱὸν Ἐλεαζάρου, καὶ ἀπέστειλεν αὐτοὺς εἰς Ῥώμην στήσαι φιλίαν καὶ συμμαχίαν). The text of the treaty between Rome and the Maccabaeans follows at 23–31. The story is also recorded by Josephus (*Ant.* 12.415–9). Cf. *2 Makk.* 4:11. Most scholars accept the identification of the ambassador with the fragmentary historian of the same name (cf. *FGrH* 723), e.g. Schürer, *HJP* III.1, p. 518.

3 Millar (1988).

was not only political, but also social and cultural.⁴ The contribution of the friendly kings was extremely relevant for the affirmation of Rome's power. Tacitus' comment that 'it was an ancient and long-accepted tradition of the Roman people to have even kings as instruments of subjection' is well-known.⁵ D. Braund, author of the main study dedicated to the 'character of client kingship', arrives at the conclusion that Rome was able to build and maintain its empire, because it was able to build and maintain friendships with the monarchies of its world.⁶ The papers in this volume deal with kingdoms and principalities in one specific part of that world, the Roman Near East [FIGURE I]. But before turning to there, some attention ought to be paid to issues which concern the empire at large.

PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION

The *amicitia* of the Roman people with kings, princes and other rulers has attracted the attention of historians for many years. Yet a unanimous definition by modern scholars of those whom the Romans officially referred to as 'kings, allies and friends of the Roman people' (*reges socii et amici populi romani*) does not exist.⁷ Particularly fashionable among modern historians is the use of the term 'client-kings', a definition which finds little support in ancient texts and traces its origin back to the post-Renaissance scholarship.⁸ F. Millar connects "the invention of the misleading modern term «client kings»"⁹ with Suetonius' description (*Aug.* 60) of the escort Augustus receives on his journeys: the kings who accompanied the *princeps* fulfilled their daily dutiful attendance (*cotidiana officia*) clad in the toga and without the emblems of royalty, 'in the manner of clients' (*more clientium praestiterunt*). It is clear that Suetonius' intention here is to provide his reader with a more vivid and familiar picture, and that the phraseology is not meant to define the relationship between these monarchs and the Roman empire.

A metaphoric sense is also behind the recourse of Proculus in the *Digesta* (49.15.7.1) on the example of the *cliens*' status, when he is speaking of the condition of people linked to Rome by treaties that were not 'equal'. The jurist is discussing the *ius postliminii*, i.e. the right of a Roman citizen, returning home from exile or captivity, to reclaim his status and *omnia pristina iura*.¹⁰ Proculus indicates

4 On the importance of *amicitia populi Romani* for the propagation of Roman culture and for the integration of foreigners see the valuable overviews by Coşkun and Heinen (2004); Coşkun (2005b); id. (2008b).

5 Tac. Agr. 14.2: *Quaedam civitates Cogidumno regi donatae (is ad nostram usque memoriam fidissimus mansit) vetere ac iam pridem recepta populi Romani consuetudine, ut haberet instrumenta servitutis et reges.*

6 Braund (1984), p. 5, who also stated that the book's "aim is to provide ... a functional definition of friendly kingship" (ibid.).

7 On this title cf. Lintott (1981); id. (1993), p. 32–6, and the contribution by M. Facella to this volume.

8 So Lintott (1997), col. 33.

9 Millar (1996), p. 162.

10 Cf. Talamanca (1990), p. 90–1; Nicosia (1999), p. 297–8. A thorough analysis of the *postlimi-*

when this ancient institute should not be enforced, and in this context provides a definition of a free people:¹¹

‘A free people is one which is not subject to the control of any other people; it is also an allied people whether it has come into friendship under an equal treaty or under a treaty that includes the provision that this people should with goodwill maintain the *maiestas* of another people. It has to be added that the second people is understood to be superior, not that the first is not free. Indeed, just as we understand our *clientes* to be free, even if they are not equal to us in authority, dignity, or power, so also those people who are bound to maintain with goodwill our *maiestas* must be understood to be free.’

The passage of Proculus has often been taken as a support for the transposition of the patron-client model to the relationship between the Roman people and some foreign states, including monarchies.¹² But, as has been stressed, in this passage Proculus is explaining how people who have accepted Rome’s sovereignty still remain free. The analogy with the condition of the Roman clients is functional to this demonstration, and it cannot be interpreted as evidence that Rome viewed its relations with these people in terms of patronage.¹³ Moreover, as C. Eilers observed, this analogy fits only those people linked to Rome by an ‘unequal’ treaty, a fact that automatically excludes other subjects who were considered in more favourable terms (e.g. people who had a *foedus aequum*, people with no treaty at all, *regna data* or *regna reddita*).¹⁴

In addition to the passage of Proculus, the text of Livy 37.54.17 has also been considered as an indication of how the Romans viewed their relationship with their foreign allies as one between patron and client. The relevant passage is part of the famous speech given by the Rhodians to the Senate in 189 BC, in which the ambassadors try to persuade the Romans to grant assistance to Rhodes in its defense against the ambitions of the Pergamenian king. The Rhodians have just reminded the senators that Rome had undertaken the duty of protecting the liberty of such a remarkable people, when they add:¹⁵

nium, is made by Cursi (1996), to be integrated with the recent study of Çoskun (2009), p. 82–107.

- 11 Proc. 8 *epist.* Dig. 49.15.7.1: *Liber autem populus est is, qui nullius alterius populi potestati est subiectus: sive is foederatus est item, sive aequo foedere in amicitiam venit sive foedere comprehensum est, ut is populus alterius populi maiestatem comiter conservaret. Hoc enim adicitur, ut intellegatur alterum populum superiorem esse, non ut intellegatur alterum non esse liberum: et quemadmodum clientes nostros intellegimus liberos esse, etiamsi neque auctoritate neque dignitate neque viri boni nobis praesunt, sic eos, qui maiestatem nostram comiter conservare debent, liberos esse intellegendum est.*
- 12 Cf. for ex. Täubler (1913), p. 63 n.1, and above all Rich (1989), with previous bibliography. Ziegler (1972), p. 93, accepts the expression ‘client states’, but specifies that it is a political, not a juridical definition.
- 13 So, most recently, Kehne (2000), p. 320–1; Eilers (2002), in particular p. 12–4.
- 14 Eilers (2002), p. 13. The opposition between *foedus aequum* and *foedus iniquum* has been strongly criticized by Luraschi (1979), p. 25–40 (with previous bibliography), followed by Labruna (1983–4), p. 301–6. See however the useful remarks of Ferrary (1990), p. 218 n.2.
- 15 Livy 37.54.17: *gentis vetustissimae nobilissimaeque vel fama rerum gestarum vel omni commendatione humanitatis doctrinarumque tuendam ab servitio regio libertatem suscepistis; hoc*

‘You have undertaken to defend against slavery to a king the liberty of a most ancient people, most famed either from the renown of its achievements or from universal praise of its culture and learning; this *patrocinium* of a whole people received into your loyalty and *clientela* it befits you to guarantee for ever.’

The text is clearly modelled on Polybius’ account of the same events (21.22.5–23.12), but the reference to a Roman *patrocinium* of Greek liberty is an addition by Livy.¹⁶ This reference, however, can hardly be interpreted as a definition of what Roman hegemony really was in the middle republic, when an enduring Roman protectorate of the Greek cities was impracticable: the terms *patrocinium* and *clientela*, it has been pointed out, are here used in a metaphorical sense.¹⁷ This passage of Livy, therefore, does not encourage to use the term *clientela* for structuring the relationship between Rome and its foreign allies.¹⁸

The rare occurrence in ancient texts of the signpost words (*cliens*, *clientela*, *patronus*, *patronatus*), especially in connection to external relations, would not, however, be a sufficient reason to renounce the expression ‘client kings’. It has been maintained that the scarcity could be attributed to the reluctance and courtesy of the elite (responsible for the versions of history that have reached us) to define their dependants and protégés with a word which would have expressed their inferiority.¹⁹ In other words, the language of diplomacy would have disguised the realities of power and would have avoided the labelling of someone as *cliens*. But the accurate analysis of Eilers has shown that there are no signs of this reluctance in the sources. On the contrary, the epigraphic evidence shows a certain pride by some individuals in exhibiting their attachment and gratitude to their patrons.²⁰ A similar point is expressed by P. Burton who, commenting on Cic. *Off.* 2.69, concludes that “there is no smokescreen of polite language, and the Romans did not mince the words: they called a client a client.”²¹ The reason behind the scarce occurrences of these terms must therefore be searched elsewhere.²² According to J. Rich the need to be called *cliens* was felt only within the state, i.e. where there was the possibility for a client to have more than one *patronus*; in interstate relations the *clientela* ter-

patrocinium receptae in fidem et clientelam vestram universae gentis perpetuum vos praestare decet (transl. E.T. Sage, LCL).

- 16 As noted by Gruen (1984), p. 176, and many others. On the passage cf. Tränkle (1977), p. 125–6. Walbank (1979), p. 177 with good reasons translates προστασία τῶν Ῥωμαίων in Polyb. 22.3.1 as ‘outward pomp, show of dignity’ rather than ‘patronage’.
- 17 So Sherwin-White (1973), p. 187–8; Gruen (1984) p. 176–7; Ferrary (1997), p. 114–9; Eilers (2002), p. 186–7.
- 18 Cf. above all Bleicken (1964); Gruen (1984), p. 158ff.
- 19 E.g. Mommsen (1864), p. 355 and n.2; Badian (1958), p. 7 and p. 12–3; Hellegouarc’h (1963), p. 55; Brunt (1988b), p. 393–5; Deniaux (1993), p. 4–5; Morstein-Marx (1998), p. 275; Verboven (2002), p. 49–62.
- 20 Eilers (2002), p. 15ff. On the role of Roman patrons in the East, see Touloumakos (1988); Canali de Rossi (2001).
- 21 Burton (2003), p. 342.
- 22 Saller (1982), p. 10–11; id. (1989), p. 54, draws a distinction between clients, who were willing to be called as such and patrons, who avoided this terminology for reasons of sensitivity. The implicit contradiction is, however, hard to overcome: if clients were glad to display their dependence, why would patrons have refrained from pleasing them?

minology was instead infrequent because Rome was the only patron and its political power over those formally known as ‘friends and allies’ was described with “the language of empire”.²³ More fitting to the pragmatic character of the Roman habit of mind is the explanation advanced by Eilers, that the “Romans regard them (sc. these terms) as applicable only when «real» clients are at issue, who are less common or less important (or both) than is sometimes supposed.”²⁴

Against this euphemism theory, one can, with respect to the allied kings, draw attention to a literary source which shows no concern in using embarrassing terminology to define them: in *Hist.* 2.81, Antiochus IV of Commagene is described by Tacitus as ‘the richest of the subject kings’ (*inserventium regum ditissimus*). The comparison of an allied king with a *servus* also occurs in the *Annales*, in reference to certain kings (Vonones, Thumelicus) who spent their youth at Rome,²⁵ although here the definition is less indicative since it is put in the mouth of the king’s enemies. It is not necessary, however, to insist on the dependence of these kings on Rome with the consolidation of its power in the Mediterranean world: their foreign policy, as is widely attested, was firmly controlled by the Romans, who expected sustained peace towards Rome and its allies, as well as prompt support in the military campaigns. It has even been held that the kingdoms of these *reges amici* were expected to pay a tribute to the Roman people,²⁶ although evidence of a regular Roman taxation imposed on a kingdom is confined to the peculiar case of Judaea.²⁷ The contribution of troops and resources does not seem to have been requested on a regular basis, but only out of necessity. Apparently Rome interfered in the internal policy of these kingdoms and in their administration only when directly involved,²⁸ although a certain degree of political subordination on the part of these kingdoms towards Rome and its representants is of course undeniable.

As a result, it will be clear that the definition of ‘client kings’ causes difficulties, not because it overemphasises a dependency of the kings on Rome, which was *de facto*, but because it mischaracterises this relationship. The features of the patron-client relationship have, in fact, been fully investigated and the analysis of many texts of different characters, both literary and legal, shows that patrons and clients were two distinct social categories, linked by moral obligations.²⁹ Their relationship was not to be based on legal responsibilities, but on moral duties imposed by the society. This definite role of patrons and clients in the Roman society

23 Rich (1989), p. 126–7.

24 Eilers (2002), p. 16.

25 So Braund (1984), p. 23 and p. 30 n. 4. For Vonones cf. *Ann.* 2.2.4 (*mancipium Caesaris, tot per annos servitutem perpessum*); for Thumelicus, son of Arminius cf. *Ann.* 1.59.1 (*subiectus servitio*); 2.46.1 (*cum coniunx, cum filius eius servitium adhuc tolerent*); 11.16.3 (*infectum alimonio servitio cultu*). Cf. also *Ann.* 14.26.1 on Tigranes V.

26 See e.g. Mommsen (1887), p. 683; Badian (1968), p. 78–9.

27 Cf. Braund (1984), p. 63–7; Sullivan (1990), p. 14; Lintott (1993), p. 35, who is less definite on the matter. Against the view that kings paid tribute to Rome, see already Bohn (1876), p. 55–64, and Sands (1908), p. 127–35.

28 The edict of Claudius on Jewish rights must be considered an exception to the usual behaviour, thus Braund (1984), p. 66.

29 Cf. Brunt (1988b), in particular p. 395, and above all Eilers (2002).

suggests that a high degree of caution should be applied in the labelling of allied kings as *clientes*, since this label implies moral obligations which were mutual.³⁰

The objection that it is not necessary to find the word *clientela* within the ancient sources to apply it to Roman foreign relationships, and that it can be applied in an ‘untechnical’ and modern sense, whenever there is an exchange of benefits and support and whenever we want to indicate positions of authority and dependence, has already been dismissed by Millar:³¹

“It can even be claimed that we are entitled to apply to ancient societies the now established common-language (or sociological) use of terms like «clientage» and «patronage» without regard to the presence, or precise use, of equivalent terms in the society in question. But to say that is to say that curiosity about the exact nuances of ancient social and political relationship is superfluous.”

The impression is one of a widespread tendency to use the word *clientela* to indicate other forms of dependence in Roman society³² and, with reference to Rome’s external policy, as a practical *escamotage* to refer to interstate relations of Rome of which we know very little.³³

The natural question which arises is why, if the term ‘client kings’ is potentially deceptive, it is still employed and preferred to more neutral (‘friendly’ or ‘allied kings’) or stronger terms (dependent kings, vassals). The reason lies, to a large extent, in the impulse of research on *clientela* generated by the work of E. Badian and his study of Roman interstate relations in the republican period.³⁴ The view of Badian, who applied the term client to all the allies whose rights and duties were determined by Rome, is very influential, as well as his interpretation of Roman international behavior as a system based on obligations and *officia*. In the middle republic Rome would have transposed to its foreign relations the pattern of the patron-client model, which was so pervasive in its own socio-political internal structure.³⁵ In his book Badian does not draw any distinction between the patronage by individual Romans and the supposed interstate patronage of the Roman people. This is the real crux of the matter, as the remarks of E. Gabba in his review to Badian’s book help us to realise.³⁶

30 The approach which tends to overcome the implications of the word *clientela* and to overlap this concept with the closely related one of *amicitia* is very practical for the modern historian, but it flattens the distinctive aspects of the two relationships and does not help in the understanding of the Roman value system in depth.

31 Millar (1984), p. 17.

32 So Brunt (1988b), p. 383–6; Ferrary (1997), p. 114, n.41.

33 See Kehne (2000).

34 Badian (1958); id. (1968), p. 14–5; id. (1984), p. 408.

35 This thesis was partly inspired by the works of Gelzer (1912), Münzer (1920) and Scullard (1951), who had all recognized the important role of the *clientelae* in the Roman internal politics of the late republic. A valuable overview of the history of researches on patronage in Roman society can be found in Bruhns, David and Nippel (1997), p. 196–216; Kehne (2000), p. 311–20; Coşkun (2005b), p. 1–9.

36 Gabba (1959), p. 189.

“L'autore ha cercato di dare, anche col titolo, un'unità che resta piuttosto esteriore. Difatti *Foreign Clientelae* serve ad indicare dapprima un particolare tipo di rapporto fra Roma ed altri stati, mentre, di poi, si riferisce alle clientele che famiglie o personaggi romani poterono costituire nelle province o addirittura in stati esteri e sfruttare per fini di politica interna. Non si nega che fra i due argomenti esistano relazioni che il Badian abilmente rileva, ma è indubbio che fra le due parti del volume esiste una certa frattura.”

As a matter of fact, while the important role of foreign *clientelae* for the affirmation of Roman political leaders is unquestioned, the idea of a patronage of Rome over foreign communities is controversial.³⁷ We have already mentioned the passages of Proculus and Livy, in which the vocabulary related to *clientela* appears, and we have briefly explained how these passages have been used to substantiate the idea of an interstate patronage by Rome. For additional support, some have looked at the speech of Flamininus on the *patrocinium* of the liberty of the Greeks, as reported by Livy,³⁸ and a famous passage in Cicero's writings, in which he regrets the Roman rule of earlier times, ‘which could more truthfully be called a *patrocinium* of the world than a dominion.’³⁹ But, again, the patron-client model is used here as a metaphor (*patrocinium* means ‘protection’), and for this reason it cannot be taken as evidence of how the Romans regarded their allies and conceived their external policy.⁴⁰ It must be noted, moreover, that the sources at issue are not contemporary to the period to which they refer, but are the result of a later reformulation.⁴¹ The same can be said for a passage of Florus, which states that the kingdom of Numidia was in the *fides et clientela* of the Roman senate and people:⁴² this expression in fact does not occur in Sallust's account and it reflects an idealised perception of the Roman past.⁴³ The criticisms to Badian's model, in conclusion, return the question back to its starting point, suggesting the use of the more appropriate definition of *amicitia*, rather than that of *clientela*,

37 The concept of ‘Rome as a patron’, fully expressed by Badian (1958) and reaffirmed by Rich (1989), is accepted e.g. by Burton (2003), p. 351 n.90.

38 Livy 34.58.11: *populus Romanus susceptum patrocinium libertatis Graecorum non deserere fidei constantiaeque suae ducit esse.*

39 Cic. *Off.* 2.26–7: *verum tamen quamdiu imperium populi Romani beneficiis tenebatur, non iniuriis, bella aut pro sociis aut de imperio gerebantur, exitus erant bellorum aut mites aut necessarii, regum, populorum, nationum portus erat et refugium senatus, nostri autem magistratus imperatoresque ex hac una re maximam laudem capere studebant, si provincias, si socios aequitate et fide defendissent. Itaque illud patrocinium orbis terrae verius quam imperium poterat nominari.*

40 As explained by Sherwin-White (1973), p. 173–8; Ferrary (1997), p. 113–9; Eilers (2002), in particular p. 186–9.

41 On this point also Badian (1984), p. 408 n.50, specifies that the *clientela* model in foreign policy “was consciously fashioned in formal terms after that model-or at least, not for a long time after it was already practised”.

42 Flor. 1.36.3: *nec illos magis quam senatum populumque Romanum, quorum in fide et in clientela regnum erat, metueret.*

43 See Gruen (1984), p. 159–60. Sallust's vision of the *reges socii et amici* is discussed by Timpe (1962), p. 334–75, who rejects Badian's interpretation of Livy 45.13.15 (the mission of Masgaba, son of Massinissa, to Rome in 168 BC), at p. 342, “als Zeugnis [...] wie Massinissa selbst sein Klientelverhältnis zu Rom verstanden habe.”

for Roman foreign relationships in the Middle Republic.⁴⁴ In any case it seems clear that the actual relationship between Rome and ‘client king’ could vary considerably, even if this fashionable modern term is at least in accordance with the fact that the imperial authorities did not draw many distinctions between their subject rulers in theory. Again, the ultimate dependence of indigenous rulers on the whim of those in power at Rome would have been clear in practice, but our modern way of referring to them implies “a greater theoretical inferiority”⁴⁵ than the ancient specification seems to justify. No doubt the modern bibliography will continue to modify the ancient idea.⁴⁶

AMICITIA AND ITS FRONTIERS

A definition of international *amicitia* had already been attempted by Mommsen, who believed that it was the result of an agreement expressed in the form of a *foedus*.⁴⁷ Further studies have shown that *amicitia* did not necessarily derive from a treaty of alliance,⁴⁸ although they have maintained Mommsen’s juridical approach to the subject. The difficulty in explaining the friendship of Rome with foreign partners as a juridical institution⁴⁹ is due to many reasons, of which the most evi-

44 As maintained by Burton (2003).

45 Lintott (1993), p. 32–6, esp. p. 34.

46 The bibliography is too long to discuss in more detail. For varying approaches to different aspects of our subject, see the antiquarian though interesting Sands (1908), which Kotula (2003), p. 235 with n.2, seems to think deals with the imperial period!; Macurdy (1937), on the phenomenon of power exercised by women in the post-republican principalities, including royal women in Judaea, Commagene and – of course – Zenobia of Palmyra; the studies by Gagé (1959) and id. (1968); Paltiel (1991), whose approach shows – we feel – the importance of our own emphasis on regional varieties. Particular consideration deserves the Trier Project on *amicitia populi Romani*, for which see Coşkun and Heinen (2004), Coşkun (2005a), and now also Coşkun (2008a), with notable contributions by H. Prantl on the Armenian king Artavasdes II, and by J. Wilker on the relation between emperors and kings. The project has focused both on international and interpersonal relationships between Rome (as a polity or individual Romans) and her foreign *amici*. At the conceptual base of the Trier project is the belief that these relationships of *amicitia* and *societas* were fundamental to reach a certain cohesion between core and periphery of the Roman empire. Kings and princes, to whom much of attention has been dedicated by the various contributors, play an obviously fundamental role in this process.

47 Mommsen (1864), p. 326–54; id. (1887) p. 591–7.

48 See already Matthaei (1907), p. 189–91; Heuß (1933), p. 12–8 and p. 53–9; Dahlheim (1968), p. 136–46. More composite is the theory of De Martino (1973), p. 13–7, p. 29–35. The view of Mommsen has been recently defended by Zack (2001), p. 179–84, but see the strong objections of Coşkun 2008c. Cf. also Laffi (2010), p. 36–42, on communities recognised as ‘friends of the Romans’. Laffi’s remarks are essential to understand the implications of such a recognition for the cities and the reasons behind the different levels of formalization.

49 According to Albanese (1963), p. 130–47 (with ancient sources), also interpersonal *amicitia* could be (and was at a certain stage) an institutionalized relation, so that we can attribute to the category of the *amici*, at p. 137, “un valore, non già sentimentale o meramente soggettivo, bensì determinato e oggettivamente determinabile, ed al quale l’ordinamento giuridico possa, concretamente, far rinvio, ai propri fini.” The idea of *amicitia* as a legalized relation or as an

dent ones are the over-determination of the terms *amicus-amicitia*,⁵⁰ and the evolution which the relationship of international *amicitia* underwent. The disadvantages caused by over-determination are clear: the more a concept covers, the less it explains. An example of this over-determination in relation to Roman foreign politics is the interchangeability of the terms *amicus* and *socius* in the sources after 168 BC.⁵¹ Concerning evolution, it is sufficient to note that if, in the third century, there are examples of international *amicitia* between Rome and other states which can be described as symmetric relationships,⁵² the same cannot be said for the bonds tied in the following centuries, when the balance of power lay on the Roman side.

The fact that it was such a broad concept made *amicitia* a very flexible instrument of Roman foreign policy and makes it a complex phenomenon to analyse. The analogies between the Roman interstate *amicitia* and the Greek *philia* as diplomatic instruments have been emphasised by E. Gruen.⁵³ He did not consider the practices of *amicitia* and *clientela* as a ‘Roman invention’, imported by the Greek world, but as a feature of the Hellenic world, which Rome found familiar and advantageous. The points of contact between the Roman and the Greek conception of private and public relationships of friendship are many and evident, but this awareness should not obscure some peculiarities, nor some differences in the use of these practices. It has often been remarked that the Greeks did not find in their language an appropriate equivalent of the Latin word *patron*, and therefore borrowed it.⁵⁴ In Greek inscriptions the word is transliterated and applied only to Roman individuals. Particularly distinctive is also the Roman creation of *formulae* (the *formula sociorum* and the *formula amicorum* – not necessarily distinct in practice), which listed individuals, cities and communities that had been recognized as *amici populi Romani* and

utilitarian bond (in particular political alliance) is challenged by Brunt (1988a), p. 351–61, and discarded by Konstan (1997), *passim*; id. (2002).

- 50 See Konstan (1997), p. 11–4. No differentiation between the terms *amicus* and *cliens* is made by Verboven (2002), p. 49–62, on the contrary the lexical specificity of *amicus* is emphasised (sometimes with obvious remarks) by Williams (2008). For the various uses of *amicus/amica*, see also Caldelli (2001), p. 21–9, who shares Albanese’s view of *amicitia* as a formalized affiliation. On the conventional use of the word *philos* and on the *philia* as institutionalized relation in the Hellenistic royal courts, see Savalli-Lestrade (1998), especially p. 251–81; Virgilio (2003), p. 136–9. The difference between the Hellenistic *philoï* and the *amici principis* has been analysed by Suspène, in his unpublished *thèse de doctorat*: *Amici principum : un aspect d’histoire politique romaine du dernier siècle de la République aux Flaviens*, École pratique des hautes études (Paris 2004), who focussed on the interpersonal friendships of the *princeps*: cf. id. (2009). On *philia*, *oikeiotes* and *syngeneia* in the diplomatic contacts between Rome and other states or *poleis* cf. now Battistoni (2009).
- 51 On this see Matthaei (1907), p. 186 and ff.; Heuss (1933), p. 26, n.1 and p. 58, n.1; Dahlheim (1968), p. 163–170; Ziegler (1972), p. 88–90; Lintott (1993), p. 32; Laffi (2010), p. 32ff.
- 52 See e.g. the *philia* with Hiero of Syracuse or with the Ptolemies in the III century, on which Cimma (1976), p. 33–41. The idea of friendship as a relation based on reciprocity and equality is now challenged by Burton (2003), esp. p. 337–40.
- 53 Gruen (1982), p. 50–68; id. (1984), p. 172–84. On the ‘Hellenistic precedents’, see also Harmand (1957), p. 83–7.
- 54 Cf. e.g. Ferrary (1997), p. 105–13.

granted various privileges.⁵⁵ These φίλοι καὶ σύμμαχοι, among whom we find also kings of Cappadocia, Pontus and Nabataea, expressed their gratitude by offering dedications to Jupiter Capitolinus and to the Roman people.⁵⁶

The position of these allied kingdoms with respect to the Roman empire is clear as far as the ancient authors are concerned: Strabo asserts that part of the Roman territory is ruled by kings;⁵⁷ Tacitus considers these kingdoms part of the empire, drawing a distinction with other *externa imperia*;⁵⁸ and Suetonius records that Augustus treated the kings of the *regna data* or *reddita* ‘as members and part of the Empire’.⁵⁹ However, when considering some evidence from the juridical field, the position of these *regna* seems less definite.⁶⁰ In the above-mentioned passage on the *postliminium*, Proculus specifies that the *populi liberi* and the *foederati* are *externi* to the Roman empire, but despite this the *postliminium* should not be enforced; a definition of a *populus liberus* and a distinction within the *populi foederati* (with respect to the nature of the *foedus*) follows.⁶¹ On the base of this evidence M.R. Cimma concludes that the territories of people who were in a more favourable position with Rome, like the *reges amici et socii*,⁶² must have been considered *externi* as well. The affirmation of Proculus finds support in Pomponius,⁶³ according to whom the *postliminium in pace* is enforceable only when the community where the *civis* was detained was not linked to Rome through a relationship of *amicitia*, *hospitium* or *foedus amicitiae causa*.

A diverse answer can be found in Festus’ epitome of Verrius Flaccus’ *De verborum significatu*, which records the evidence of Aelius Gallus about *postliminium*. According to Aelius Gallus, *cum populis liberis et confoederatis et cum regibus postliminium nobis est ita, uti cum hostibus* (‘with free people, with allies and with

- 55 See on this Bowman (1989–90), p. 330–36 (with sources) and the clarifying re-examination of these complex issues by Laffi (2010), p. 30ff. Cf. also Valvo (2001), p. 135–45; Raggi (2001), p. 109–13, together with his contribution to this volume. A detailed study by Raggi discussing the privileges of Greek citizens who were recognized individually as *amici populi Romani* is forthcoming.
- 56 Most of these inscriptions were published by Degraffi (1951–52), p. 19–47 and id. in *ILLRP* I 174–181a, b, then reanalysed by Moretti in *IGUR* I 5–20 and Mellor (1978), p. 319–30. On the epigraphic evidence of *principes et reges externi* who stayed in Rome see Ricci (1996), p. 561–92.
- 57 Strabo 17.3.25 (840): καὶ βασιλεῖς δὲ καὶ δυνάσται καὶ δεκαρχίαι τῆς ἐκείνου μερίδος καὶ εἰςὶ καὶ ὑπῆρξαν ἀεί.
- 58 Tac. *Ann.* 4.5.2: *accolis Hiberno Albanoque et aliis regibus, qui magnitudine nostra proteguntur adversum externa imperia*. On this passage cf. the remarks of Potter (1991), p. 288–9. A distinction between *socii* and *nationes exterae* is drawn also by Cic. *Div. Caec.* 3,7; *Verr.* 2.1.68.
- 59 Suet. *Aug.* 48: *reges socios [...] nec aliter universos quam membra partesque imperii curae habuit*.
- 60 So Lemosse (1967), p. 9ff.; Cimma (1976), p. 221–9.
- 61 Proc. 8 *epist.* Dig. 49.15.7 (quoted at n. 11).
- 62 More precisely, Cimma (1976), p. 225–6, includes in this category “i territori appartenenti a sovrani *non* nemici di Roma, strappati ad un conquistatore nemico, e poi liberati dalla signoria romana e restituiti agli stessi sovrani, oppure i territori direttamente strappati al nemico e conferiti ad altri”.
- 63 Pomp. 37 *ad Q. Mucium* Dig. 49.15.5.2.

kings, *postliminium* is for us the same as with regard to enemies’).⁶⁴ Scholars disagree whether these two sources – Proculus and Aelius Gallus – actually contradict each other,⁶⁵ or whether they approach the problem only from different angles.⁶⁶ What emerges from a comparison between them, and from the rhetoric structure used by Proculus (*non dubito, quin foederati et liberi nobis externi sint, nec inter nos atque eos postliminium esse...*, ‘I have no doubt that although free peoples and those bound to us by treaty are foreigners to us, there is no *postliminium* between us and them’), is that the answer to the enforcement of the *postliminium* with the above-mentioned category was a matter of discussion.⁶⁷ Already earlier on, at the time of Cicero’s *maiores*, other aspects of this institute had been debated, as is attested by a passage of the *De oratore*, in which Licinius Crassus gives some instances of the importance of legal knowledge for the orator.⁶⁸ According to Braund, the ambiguity of these sources shows that the position of the friendly kings has been misconceived by modern historians. The kings *were* the frontiers of the Roman empire: “in one sense inside the empire and in another outside it; in reality they were neither and both”. For this reason, “we should not be surprised to find that particular Romans chose to consider kings to be inside or outside the empire, as it suited them.”⁶⁹

The remarks of Braund are convincing, but some clarifications ought to be made in order to reinforce his conclusions. The first point to stress is that the controversies on the position of the friendly kingdoms are found only amongst the jurists who dealt with the issue, and not with the ancient authors, who instead expressed an uniform view.⁷⁰ The ancient authors wrote from a different perspective than the ancient jurists, and hence raised different questions. Strabo, Tacitus and Suetonius have little interest in the institutional inconsistencies which the relationship with another sovereignty could originate, because they perceived the allied kingdoms only as an element of a wider system, which was the Roman empire. It should not be ignored either that the disagreement in the solutions proposed by the jurists can be fruit not only of the different perspectives from which an institute has been examined, but also of the various historical contexts in which these solutions

64 Ael. Gall. *Verb. sign.* Fr. 1 (ed. Lindsay).

65 So e.g. Mommsen (1887), p. 656 n.1; Baviera (1898), p. 41–3; Amirante (1950), p. 9–24; Kreller (1953), col. 867–8; Cimma (1976), p. 227.

66 See e.g. Heuß (1933), p. 10 n.1, who comments that “auch Proculus [as Aelius Gallus] stellt sich ausdrücklich auf diesen Standpunkt und gibt zu, daß die civitates liberae externae seien und die Möglichkeit an sich zum *postliminium*, wie man in seinem Sinn ergänzen muß, gegeben ist; aber wozu dies, fährt er fort, da es doch praktisch gar nicht in Frage kommt, weil die Sicherheit der einzelnen Personen sowieso schon gewährleistet wird?” Cursi (1996), p. 145–54, instead stresses the two different situations analysed by these sources (p. 151: “Elio Gallo si occupa del profilo patologico del rapporto con il popolo libero o federato; Proculo invece descrive la situazione fisiologica che discende naturalmente dall’aver instaurato un rapporto con Roma”), a solution which does not convince Çoskun 2009, p. 95–6, n.292.

67 Cf. also Cursi (1996), p. 145, who speaks of “una probabile *vexata quaestio*”.

68 *De or.* I. 40. 182.

69 Braund (1984), p. 182.

70 Cf. Lemosse (1967), p. 9–16; Cimma (1976), p. 229.

were elaborated.⁷¹ When Paulus writes about the return of the *civis* by *postliminium*, he specifies that *sed et si in civitatem sociam amicumve aut ad regem socium vel amicum venerit, statim postliminio redisse videtur, quia ibi primum nomine publico tutus esse incipiat* ('however, if he comes to an allied or friendly *civitas*, or to the court of an allied or friendly king, he is forthwith seen as having returned with *postliminium*, because it is there that he first, by the authority of the state, begins to be safe').⁷² The *tutela nomine publico* of the *civis* therefore should begin when he overcomes the boundaries of a state linked to Rome by friendly relationships. The situation has clearly changed from the time of Aelius Gallus, when the position of the *populi liberi, confederati et reges* was considered equal to that of the enemies (*uti cum hostibus*)⁷³ for the enforcement of the *postliminium* and the question whether these people were *externi* to Rome was pointless. In the words of M.F. Cursi, "la relazione di *societas* o di *amicitia* consente infatti di estendere fittiziamente i confini territoriali della comunità romana, ai fini dell'applicazione del postliminio."⁷⁴ Indeed, the allied kingdoms constituted the frontiers of the empire, and it was also on these fluctuating frontiers⁷⁵ that Rome counted when it came to protection from external enemies.

FRIENDLY RELATIONS: FACING ROMAN POWER IN THE NEAR EAST

The present collection of studies is devoted to the friendly relations that Rome maintained with kings and princes in the Levantine lands, of which there were many. In the words of W. Ball, the region was "a patchwork of small but glittering princely states",⁷⁶ some of which are well known, while others have hardly left any traces, such as the tetrarchy of the Nazerini (or 'Nosairis', according to the Loeb translation), which according to Pliny was located on the other side of the river Marsyas from Apamea,⁷⁷ or indeed the 'seventeen tetrarchies divided into king-

71 The different views of Aelius Gallus and Proculus on *postliminium* have been explained in light of the transformations that occurred in the relationship between Rome and the *populi liberi* and *foederati* between II BC and I AD: so e.g. Mommsen (1887), p. 656 n.1; Amirante (1950), p. 14–5; Grelle (1990), p. 251 ff; Kornhardt 1953, p. 29; Watson 1967, p. 249–51. *Contra*: Kreller (1953), col. 868 (for whom the chronological space which separates Aelius Gallus from Proculus is too narrow "für den Eintritt neuer Rechtsverhältnisse"), De Martino (1973), p. 48 n.95 (who assumes, without argument, that "le concezioni romane sui rapporti internazionali si erano sviluppate in età anteriore e non risulta che alla fine della repubblica subirono modifiche") and Cursi (1996), p. 148 (who tries to reduce the interval of time between the two sources).

72 Paul. 16 *ad Sab.* Dig. 49.15.19.3.

73 On this formulation cf. now Çoskun 2009, p. 95–6.

74 Cursi (1996), p. 151–2.

75 Cf. Lemosse (1967), p. 8. Kornemann (1934), p. 99, distinguished between the official frontier of the Roman empire ("die Reichsgrenze") and the unofficial frontiers of the empire ("die unsichtbaren Grenzen des römischen Reiches"), constituted by the people in *amicitia* with Rome. On this definition cf. Troussset (1993), p. 26.

76 Ball (2000), p. 30. For an excellent recent discussion of some of those, see also Gatier (2007).

77 *HN* 5.19.81: *Coele habet Apameam Marsya amne divisam a Nazerinorum tetrarchia*, according

doms and bearing barbarian names' to which the *Historia Naturalis* enigmatically refers.⁷⁸ Our focus on the Near East – in the first place determined by our shared interest in the region – does not need an apology. Over time, emperors came to spend increasing periods of time in the area, either on campaign or during non-militaristic journeys; the concentration of legions in the Near Eastern provinces grew substantially, from four (out of twenty-five) in AD 23 (Tac., *Ann.* 4.5) to ten (out of thirty-three) by the early third century;⁷⁹ not to mention the empire's eventual switch to its eastern part later on in history. Our decision to focus above all on individual sub-regions fits well with recent approaches to the Roman Near East, which have put similar emphasis on regional varieties.⁸⁰ Naturally, comparisons can be drawn between the different kingdoms and principalities of the region, and specifically with regard to their relation with the empire. However, emphasis throughout this book will be on the specifics of each area or issue discussed, not on the general nature of client kingship as such. Though the latter is obviously important – and though we of course also hope that this collection of essays will be of benefit to those more interested in the way in which Rome's empire functioned – the degree of variety between the sources for each sub-region makes it also legitimate to focus through a set of updated regional studies on peculiarities rather than generalities.⁸¹ At the same time, more consideration is given to what archaeology and numismatics can contribute to the subject, not only in passing, but as separate topics of study (above all in the contributions by K. Dahmen and A. Kropp). It needs to be made clear at the outset that we have decided to 'open' the Roman Near Eastern frontiers a bit beyond what is commonly taken into account. We have included papers on post-Mithradatic Pontus (by A. Primo), on Cleopatra's Egypt (by R. Strootman) and, in order to have the subject illuminated by Latin poetry, on Bithynia (by Ll. Morgan). This will also serve to study the diversity within the strictly Levantine lands themselves in a slightly broader context.

It ought to be emphasised here too that no attempt has been made to be comprehensive or to cover each and every 'client kingdom' in the region. As regards the main casualties, although they do occasionally emerge throughout the book, no separate studies on the Herodians and the Nabataeans are included. We do not apologise for this, but hope that this volume as such may serve as a counterbalance to the emphasis that is usually placed on these two – admittedly very important – Near

to Millar (1993), p. 240–1, the east side of the mountain-chain nowadays known as the Jebel Ansariyeh.

78 *HN* 5.19.82: ... *praeter tetrarchias in regna discriptas barbaris nominibus xvii.*

79 Cf. Millar (1993), p. 2: "Looked at from Rome, the Near East gained an ever-increasing significance in terms of the extension of territory, the acquisition of tribute revenue and the deployment of military force." Cf. *ibid.*, p. 2–3. Cf. now Wheeler (2007).

80 See, above all, Millar (1993). Cf. Ball (2000); Sartre (2001); *id.* (2005). Cf. Kaizer (2003a) for a review of the various approaches to the theme and for further bibliographical references.

81 Note the statement by Syme (1935), p. 95, concerning a very different geographical context, that "the diversity of local and temporal conditions is so great that every instance must be examined on its own merits – statements of universal application are likely to be as general and as useless as the extended and diluted *φιλία* in the ideal State of Plato."

Eastern kingdoms.⁸² Furthermore, the kingdom of Armenia features solely in the paper on coinage, and Cappadocia – directly on the fringes of the Near East in its most narrow sense – is not covered individually either.⁸³

It is hard to decide when precisely the story of the kingdoms and principalities of the Roman Near East should start.⁸⁴ Sometimes we are helped by the fact that evidence for a certain place or area seems to appear out of the blue. For example, the evidence for the kingdom of Hatra (situated for nearly all of its history within the Parthian sphere of influence) appears in the late first century AD and ends with the fall of the city in ca AD 240.⁸⁵ Other regions, such as Commagene, had a history that went back to the early Hellenistic period, even if the details of that earliest history are not always clearly traceable.⁸⁶ In most cases, however, it seems best to commence discussion around the time of Pompey the Great's exploits in the Levant. To cut a long story very short, besides creating the first Near Eastern province, Syria, in AD 64/3, Pompey redrew the map of the region also by installing, confirming or removing a large number of independent rulers.⁸⁷ The episode occasionally resulted in exaggerations on the part of Rome, as when placards were carried in front of Pompey's triumphal procession 'showing the names of all the countries over which he was triumphing' and including 'Syria, Cilicia, Mesopotamia, Phoenicia, Palestine, Judaea and Arabia' (Plut. *Pomp.* 45), and indeed in sheer misrepresentations, as when Marcus Aemilius Scaurus, a former quaestor under Pompey who in 62 undertook a campaign against the Nabataean king Aretas (III) that was quickly abandoned when 300 talents were paid to Rome (Jos. *Ant.* 14.80–1), in 58 celebrated his aedileship with a coin that "quite falsely" depicted Aretas kneeling in an act of surrender.⁸⁸

82 A major international conference on the Herodians and the Nabataeans took place at the British Museum in 2001. It has now been published in two volumes, in the same series as the present book, with each volume focusing on one of the two dynasties: Kokkinos (2007) and Politis (2007). On the relationship of Herod the Great with Rome see now also Wilker (2007); Günther (2007), which contains papers from a conference in Bochum that brought together historical and archaeological approaches to the 'client kingship' of Herod; Jacobson and Kokkinos (2009). On the flowering of interest for Herod the Great and on current scholarly approaches, cf. Franco (2009).

83 Note that neither Millar (1993) nor Sartre (2005) discusses Cappadocia as part of the Near East. A study of the kingdom in the Hellenistic period is in preparation by S. Panichi, who had originally intended to be a contributor to this book. In the meantime, see Panichi (2000) and ead. (2005), and on the region in the Roman period also Cassia (2004).

84 For the earlier period, see – from the republican perspective (and focussing on Asia Minor instead) – Stein-Kramer (1988), which is described by Coşkun and Heinen (2004), p. 57, n.27 as an investigation of the tension between 'Rechtsnorm' and political reality, and – from the Hellenistic perspective – the contributions in Prost (2003).

85 To be more precise, kingship was introduced at Hatra at some point in the second half of the second century AD, replacing a system of sometimes multiple coexisting 'lords', see Sommer (2003b).

86 On the early history of Commagene, see Facella (1999), and ead. (2006), p. 137–98.

87 For the best overview, see Sartre (2005), p. 37–44.

88 The quote is from Millar (1993), p. 219. For the coin, see *RRC* I, p. 446, n°422. Cf. Bowersock

Caesar's stay in (or rather passing through) the region was of course too short to have any impact on geographical and other divisions, but the unknown author of the *Alexandrian War* gives a telling account – which is perhaps too stereotypical to be of any historical value – of the kind of issues the Near Eastern dynasts would have been discussing with Caesar: ‘as for kings, sovereigns and dynasts neighbouring on the province, who had all hastened together to him, he received them into his trust on condition of protecting and defending the province, and dismissed them as being now the most loyal friends of himself and the Roman people’.⁸⁹ In any case, kings and petty rulers seem to have realised very soon after the arrival in the Orient of ‘Rome’ that proper choices had to be made between the various contenders of imperial power. Strabo (16.2.10 [753]) describes in detail the support by various local dynasts that the Pompeian commander Caecilius Bassus enjoyed when he held out in besieged Apamea against the Caesarian armies, not only because ‘the country supplied his army with provisions’, but also since he had ‘plenty of allies, I mean the neighbouring chieftains, who possessed strongholds’ (καὶ συμμάχων εὐπόρει τῶν πλησίον φυλάρχων, ἐχόντων εὐερκῆ χωρία). A generation later, following Antony's defeat at Actium, his supporter Herod famously made haste to Rhodes to meet Octavian: Josephus describes how the king removed his diadem but spoke proudly to the young Caesar about his previous support to Antony: ‘that he was not indeed in the army with him, because the Arabians had diverted him; but that he had sent him both money and corn, which was but too little in comparison of what he ought to have done for him.’ Convinced of, and impressed by, Herod's correct behaviour to his benefactor, Octavian ‘restored him his diadem again; and encouraged him to exhibit himself as great a friend to himself as he had been to Antony, and then had him in great esteem’.⁹⁰

With the foundation of the principate, matters became more unequivocal,⁹¹ though with each problematic accession in Rome – resulting for example in the civil wars at the end of the Julio-Claudian dynasty and after the murder of Commodus, or simply with usurpers laying claim to the purple against the incumbent emperor, such as the revolt of Avidius Cassius during the reign of Marcus Aurelius – principalities, in the same way as cities, were forced to make a choice as to whom they considered Rome's rightful representative.⁹² And wrong choices could have horrific conse-

(1983), p. 34–5: “So grotesque a misrepresentation of Scaurus' exploits has long been recognized for the pomposity that it was”.

89 [Caes.] *Bell. Alex.* 65: *reges, tyrannos, dynastas provinciae finitimos, qui omnes ad eum concurrerant, receptos in fidem condicionibus impositis provinciae tuendae ac defendendae dimittit et sibi et populo Romano amicissimos.* Cf. the contribution to this volume by M. Facella.

90 *Ant.* 15.6.6–7 (187–195): στρατείας μὲν οὐ κοινωνήσας κατὰ περιολκὰς τῶν Ἀράβων, πέμψας δὲ καὶ χρήματα καὶ σῖτον ἐκείνῳ. καὶ ταῦτ' εἶναι μετριώτερα τῶν ἐπιβαλλόντων αὐτῷ γενέσθαι [... ..] καὶ τό τε διάδημα πάλιν ἀποκαθίστησιν αὐτῷ, καὶ προτρεψάμενος μηδὲν ἐλάττω περὶ αὐτὸν ἢ πρότερον ἦν περὶ τὸν Ἀντώνιον φαίνεσθαι, διὰ πάσης ἦγε τιμῆς. For the comparable cases of Polemo and Pythodoris in the Pontic region, see the contribution to this volume by A. Primo.

91 But note the comments of Kotula (2003), p. 239, who emphasises that Augustus often “hésita entre le maintien de royaumes clients et un gouvernement direct par annexion.”

92 Concerning Avidius Cassius, as Spieß (1975), p. 16–7, pointed out, there is no good evidence

quences indeed, as not each emperor was as skillful (or interested) in playing the compassionate game as well as Augustus. Especially Septimius Severus is notorious for rewarding those supporting him and punishing those supporting Pescennius Niger. Antioch, where Niger had proclaimed himself emperor (Herodian 2.7.7–8.6) got famously relegated to the status of a κόμη in the territory of Laodicea (Herodian 3.6.9; cf. 3.3.3). Palmyra, a few generations before its local leaders assumed the title King of Kings (in direct aspiration to the Sasanian throne⁹³), seems to have escaped punishment only because the apparent power struggle between local supporters of Niger and of Severus was eventually decided in favour of the latter: on the losers' side, we have the Aramaic part of a bilingual inscription from the temple of Bel from August 193, in which the usurper's name seems to have suffered *damnatio memoriae*,⁹⁴ whereas as regards the winners, it can be assumed that the grandfather of Septimius Odaenathus was one of those who “belonged to this group and obtained Roman citizenship in recompense for their loyal services”.⁹⁵ And some principalities were sacrificed in order to construct the new *provincia* Osrhoene, although in this case it is difficult to understand what happened precisely. It had of course long been taken for granted by scholars that the new province was created out of the royal territories of Edessa, as a retribution for that kingdom's backing of Niger. The later coins from Edessa that depicted not only the emperor on the obverse, but also Abgar VIII on the reverse,⁹⁶ were simply seen as evidence that the ‘traitor king’ had at some point returned to favour. However, an inscription first published in 1983 records how the first governor of the new province established the border *inter provinciam Osrhoenam et regnum Abgari*, implying that the Edessan kingdom survived Osrhoene's establishment.⁹⁷ Not giving up on the notion of punishment, some scholars have nonetheless argued that Abgar “lost a substantial amount of his kingdom”,⁹⁸ but others have, perhaps more convincingly, pointed out that leaving a king whom he wanted

for the old theory that Cassius was a descendant of the royal house of Commagene and that as such he wanted to install a renewed Eastern kingdom. Interestingly from an ideological point of view, but surely incorrect, is the notification in Dio 72.27.1^a that Marcus refused the outside assistance that was offered to him (without Dio specifying by whom), ‘for he declared that the barbarians ought not to know of the troubles arising between Romans’ (λέγων μὴ χρῆναι τοὺς βαρβάρους εἰδέναι τὰ μετὰξὺ Ῥωμαίων κινούμενα κακὰ).

93 Thus Gawlikowski (2007), p. 307.

94 *Inv.* IX.26, with only [ʿw]tqrṯwr qs[r], the Palmyrenean-Aramaic transliteration of Ἀὐτοκράτωρ Καῖσαρ (i.e. *Imperator Caesar*), still legible in the relevant lines. Cf. Sartre (2005), p. 548, n.64, who draws attention to the fact that “only the hammering inflicted [...] allows us to think that the name in question was indeed Pescennius Niger.”

95 Sartre (2005), p. 352. It is noted by A. Schmidt-Colinet, in Herzig and Schmidt-Colinet (1991), p. 68, that “the great number of inscriptions for the whole Severian family set up by Palmyra is the more striking as almost no such inscriptions are known within the whole rest of the Near East.” J.-C. Balty, in Delplace and Dentzer-Feydy (2005), p. 336, rightly states that “Palmyre, qui témoignera par la suite de son attachement à la dynastie des Sévères, ne s’était certainement pas montrée tout entière favorable à Pescennius Niger.”

96 *BMC Arabia*, p. 94–6, n^{os} 14–35.

97 Wagner (1983b), p. 113. Cf. Ross (2001), p. 50.

98 Thus Ross (2001), p. 50–1, who reckons that “the loss of territory would seem to amount to approximately the western half of the kingdom.”

to punish on his throne would have been strange behavior on the part of Severus indeed.⁹⁹ Since there is no actual evidence that Abgar ever supported Niger against Severus, it is likely that the new *provincia* Osrhoene was created out of *other* territories, with the nearby principalities of Anthemusia and Carrhae perhaps as the best candidates.¹⁰⁰

At first sight, the story of the ‘client kingdoms’ in the Roman Near East seems to be a rather straightforward one of continuous annexation, with the first main phase ending in AD 106 with the creation of *provincia* Arabia out of the Nabataean kingdom. It has also been suggested that they could disappear only after preparing their respective regions for direct administration by Rome: in that way, they could be seen as the victims of their own success.¹⁰¹ But these general explanations, or the idea of an evolving ‘strategy’ of the empire from distant control to annexation, are not always applicable to all the lands of the Near East.¹⁰² As we will see for example in M. Sommer’s chapter on Edessa, AD 106 can also be seen as the *beginning* of a new phase of the history of ‘client kingdoms’. In any case, Rome seems not to have been concerned – often in contrast with modern scholars – that the way its sphere of influence was ruled was not always homogeneous, or what we would call ‘logical’. One should not forget that a similar local autonomy was encouraged, or at least conceded, with regard to many of the empire’s cities. And establishing or re-establishing dynastic rule was as powerful a statement as removing it: both actions left little doubt as to where the real power of decision-making lay,¹⁰³ as when Commagene in the early first and Edessa in the third century AD were (at least temporarily) recreated as kingdoms after they were annexed earlier on. But it is probably not necessary always to look for ideological reasons behind the re-installation, or increase, of dynastic rule. It may well be the case that Claudius expressed true gratitude and friendship towards Agrippa for the latter’s support to him during the stressful succession episode, when he not only (re-)created for him the kingdom of Judaea as it had been under Agrippa’s grandfather Herod the Great, but even enlarged it with the tetrarchy of Lysanias and some other “quite undefinable”¹⁰⁴ territories around the Anti-Lebanon.¹⁰⁵ Ancient authors can be very clear about what such temporary reversions from provincial

99 Cf. Sartre (2001), p. 617.

100 Gawlikowski (1998b), p. 423–4. Of course, the question remains of why the new province was given a name so similar to that of the neighbouring kingdom. Following a suggestion by O. Hekster, Kaizer (2003a), p. 291, argued that this could be seen as “a shrewd means of presenting the dichotomy between royal and provincial lands as a bipartite imperial unity.”

101 E.g. Sartre (2001), p. 65. Mitchell (1993) I, p. 33, stated, with regard to the lands of Anatolia, that it was “almost a cliché of Roman administrative practice” to distinguish between direct rule over ‘civilised’ areas and dynastic rule over ‘uncivilised’ ones.

102 Note the suggestion by Rey-Coquais (1994), p. 47, n.27, that, when certain client kings died, “Rome crut pouvoir exercer l’administration directe; les difficultés rencontrées firent revenir au système du roi client, dont l’expérience montrait les avantages, si l’on pensait avoir sous la main un prince qui pût donner satisfaction.”

103 Cf. Braund (1984), p. 188: “imperialism need not mean annexation”.

104 Millar (1993), p. 60.

105 All references in Schürer, *HJP* I, p. 442–5. Cf. Millar (1993), p. 31, on what seem inconsistent actions on the part of Octavian earlier on.

land to ‘independent kingdom’ actually meant for Rome’s empire, and Strabo bluntly states, in the very final lines of his work (17.3.25 [840]), that ‘kings, also, and potentates and decarchies are now, and always have been, in Caesar’s portion’ (καὶ βασιλεῖς δὲ καὶ δυνάσται καὶ δεκαρχίαι τῆς ἐκείνου μερίδος καὶ εἰσὶ καὶ ὑπῆρξαν ἄει).

The situation in the Near East is further complicated by the presence of another superpower that could make its own decisions as regards attitudes towards principalities, an element reflected again by Strabo, when he writes that ‘some of the chieftains [i.e. of the Arabians as far as Babylonia] preferred to give ear to the Parthians and others to the Romans’ (16.1.28 [748]).¹⁰⁶ It means that we ought not to lose sight of the fact that ‘Roman Near East’ is very much a western, Classicist’s point of view, and that the region can, and perhaps should, similarly be referred to as the ‘Parthian Near West’, as R. Fowler brilliantly labels it in his paper. This is of course not the place to give a full overview of the history of Rome’s and Parthia’s dealings with all the minor kingdoms in between them, and a few general points may suffice here.¹⁰⁷ As regards the Parthian sphere of influence, the diversity of sub-regions was reflected in the Arsacid acceptance of native satraps, occasionally counterbalanced by direct blood relationship between local rulers and the main royal house. This is perhaps most clearly illustrated by the case of the Gulf kingdom of Characene, whose indigenous kings – as is shown by the rich numismatic evidence – found themselves challenged by pretenders, sometimes replaced by usurpers, and twice interrupted by Arsacid princes.¹⁰⁸ With the gradual extension eastwards of Rome’s empire, the connections – more or less debatable¹⁰⁹ – between central (Arsacid) and peripheral (indigenous) dynasties in the Parthian world were subject to erosion. However, we should not lose sight of the fact that the Arsacids’ activities in the Near East formed only one of their many wearisome pursuits, albeit the one which is best known to us through the Classical sources. In general, the Parthians seem to have been a good deal less interested in expanding their territory into the Levantine lands than Rome.¹¹⁰

In any case, the story of Rome and Parthia is certainly not always one that can be put in simple and regular terms of antagonism, as is shown for instance by the complexities of what Tacitus (*Ann.* 6.32–37) tells us about events in AD 35, when the *legatus* Lucius Vitellius was sent to support the Parthian pretender Tiridates in his attempt to take the throne of Artabanus III: Vitellius crossed the Euphrates with his legions and auxiliaries and then combined his forces with those led by the Parthian commander of Mesopotamia, Ornaspasdes – ‘once an exile and a not inglorious co-

106 Cf. Millar (1993), p. 33, pointing out that “where the river traversed the Fertile Crescent there was a clear frontier. But in the wide steppe zone to the south it was a matter of unstable alliances and diplomatic relations.”

107 For a sourcebook on the relation between Rome and the Persians, see Winter and Dignas (2001); eid. (2007).

108 Schuol (2000), p. 291–378.

109 E.g. Potter (1987), for the hypotheses of actual blood relationship between the Abgarid dynasty of Edessa on the one hand and the royal house of Hatra and the Arsacids on the other, and of marriage liaisons between Arsacids and Hatrene notables.

110 On the relation between Parthia and its *Eastern* neighbours, see Olbrycht (1998).

adjutor of Tiberius when he was stamping out the Dalmatic war, he had been rewarded by a grant of Roman citizenship: later, he had regained the friendship of his king, stood high in his favour, and held the governorship of the plains, which, encircled by the famous streams of Tigris and Euphrates, have received the name of Mesopotamia.¹¹¹ But the equilibrium between the two empires could of course be more seriously shaken, and the preferred scheme of Roman ascendancy – at least, that is how Roman sources usually present the situation, as when Phraates IV's return of the standards lost by Crassus and Antony is famously presented in Augustan poetry and imagery as a victory in arms rather than as the result of the diplomatic engagement which had preceded it – could even be reversed: following his defeat at Nisibis in AD 217, Macrinus was forced to pay money to the Parthian Artabanus V (who had of course earlier declined to give his daughter in marriage to Caracalla)¹¹², and Philip the Arab famously became a tributary to the Sasanian Shapur I.¹¹³

As the various contributions to this volume show, the situation could vary from kingdom to kingdom and from principality to principality. There was no rigid structure implemented, and some realms were able to enjoy more independence than others. The evidence shows the remarkable flexibility on the part of Rome to adapt itself, but also the degree of influence that individual decisions (first by generals, then by emperors) had on the situation. However, the situation could also have something to do with the notion of a hereditary right to rule. It could be argued for example that a king such as Herod the Great, as an Idumaeen who ruled over Judaea, was in a more precarious situation than kings who could (and/or did) claim that they ruled over the same territories their ancestors had ruled since time immemorial, or at least for generations. It seems to have been typical for Rome to respect the 'divine' rights of quasi-dependent rulers to govern their ancestral lands, as long as its own imperial interests were not damaged.¹¹⁴ That being said, the list of kings who ruled over *new* territories which the Romans had given them, as different from the areas over which their families had ruled, or claimed to have ruled, for generations, reveals to what degree Rome changed the map of the Near East. To mention only a few examples under the Julio-Claudians: Archelaus II, son of the late Cappadocian king, was appointed by Tiberius over Cilicia;¹¹⁵ Caligula added the coastal part of Cilicia to the ancestral realm (ἡ ὀ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ ἔσχε) of Antiochus IV of

111 Tac. *Ann.* 6.37: *exul quondam et Tiberio, cum Delmaticum bellum conficeret, haud inglorius auxiliator eoque civitate Romana donatus, mox repetita amicitia regis multo apud eum honore, praefectus campis, qui Euphrate et Tigre inclutis amnibus circumflui Mesopotamiae nomen acceperunt.* Cf. Millar (1993), p. 54–5.

112 Macrinus vs Artabanus: Dio 79.26.2–27.3; Caracalla's daughter: Dio 79.1.1.

113 In the *Res Gestae Divi Saporis*, the Sasanian leader claims that Philip paid him '500,000 denars' (as is interestingly illustrated on Shapur's victory reliefs at Naqsh-e Rostam and Bishapur).

114 See Dignas (2002), p. 110–222, for similar comments with regard to priests in charge of local temples in the Eastern Roman empire, esp. p. 219: "at any time, the Roman rulers expressed their intention to respect the authority and property of the gods" – although such ethics could easily be thrown overboard if and when required. Contra Paltiel (1991), p. 201, who argues that Vespasian opted for a "deliberate destruction for political reasons" of the royal cult in Com-magene, since "the Roman authorities saw in them a subversive influence."

115 Tac. *Ann.* 6.41.

Commagene;¹¹⁶ in AD 50 Agrippa II was made king over Chalcis, hence following in the footsteps of his uncle Herod of Chalcis, but three years later he saw his realm simply exchanged by Rome for the larger territory that his great-uncle Philip, and then his father Agrippa, had once ruled,¹¹⁷ and Aristobulus, son of Herod of Chalcis, was appointed by Nero as king of Armenia Minor.¹¹⁸ In such cases the kings and princes would have *needed* to be under Rome's wings even more, as there would have been no proper basis for support of their regime among the population of an area suddenly faced with an outsider at the helm. One could even argue that one of Rome's alternative means to secure loyalty on the part of kings and princes was precisely to give them territory that had not traditionally been held by the dynasties to which they belonged.

Only seldom can we find traces in our sources as regards the impact such decisions actually made on the various populations of the Near East. A parable in the gospel of Luke, apparently reflecting Archelaus' trip to Rome in order to ask Augustus for the throne of his father Herod the Great and the reaction of his subjects-to-be, leaves no doubt as to the common people's awareness that the power to make and to break their king lay with the emperor.¹¹⁹ The details of the story are known from Josephus – who records (*BJ* 2.1.1 [2]) how Archelaus made a show of not using his royal titlature and imagery in Judaea 'until his right to the succession had been ratified by Caesar' (ἕως ἂν αὐτῷ Καίσαρ ἐπικυρώσῃ τὴν διαδοχὴν) – and Nicolaus of Damascus. Together they give us a full story of rival parties attending Augustus' tribunal in Rome, with some Jews (according to Josephus) pleading 'for the autonomy of their nation' (περὶ τῆς τοῦ ἔθνους αὐτονομίας), representatives of the Greek cities which had been part of Herod's kingdom (according to Nicolaus) asking for freedom (ἐπρεσβεύσαντο δὲ καὶ αἱ ὑφ' Ἡρώδη Ἑλληνίδες πόλεις αἰτούμεναι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν παρὰ Καίσαρος), and the whole *ethnos* of the Judaeans (still according to Nicolaus: ὅλον δὲ τὸ Ἰουδαίων ἔθνος) preferring to become part of the provincial system (καὶ ἀξιοῦν μάλιστα μὲν ὑπὸ Καίσαρι εἶναι ...), and if that was not possible to be ruled by the 'younger brother', i.e. another son of Herod, instead of by Archelaus (... εἰ δὲ μή, ὑπὸ γε οὖν τῷ νεωτέρῳ ἀδελφῷ).¹²⁰ Perhaps even more outspoken, especially with regard to the different classes, is the evidence for the events following the death of Antiochus III of Commagene, when different embassies from the region are said to have reached Tiberius, one side ask-

116 Dio 59.8.2.

117 Jos. *BJ* 2.12.8 (247): '[Claudius, through Felix, procurator of Judaea] transferred Agrippa from Chalcis to a larger kingdom' (ἐκ δὲ τῆς Χαλκίδος Ἀγρίππαν εἰς μείζονα βασιλείαν μετατίθησιν). Cf. *Ant.* 20.7.1 (138).

118 Jos. *Ant.* 20.8.4 (158); *BJ* 2.13.1 (252); Tac. *Ann.* 13.7 (cf. 14.26).

119 19.12–14: 'A certain nobleman went into a far country to receive for himself a kingdom, and to return. And he called his ten servants, and delivered them ten pounds, and said unto them, "Occupy till I come". But his citizens hated him, and sent a message after him, saying, "We will not have this [man] to reign over us."' Cf. Millar (1996), p. 160: "Although no names are used, and no context is given, the reference is unmistakable."

120 Jos. *BJ* 2.2.4 (23)–2.2.7 (38) and 2.6.1 (80)–2.6.3 (100), at 2.80; *FGrH* 90 F 136 [8–11], at [8]. Cf. Millar (1993), p. 43, who refers to the 'younger brother' as "apparently Philip". Many thanks to Benedikt Eckhardt for discussing this passage with one of us.

ing for the introduction of provincial rule and the other side asking for a new king. In the words of Josephus, ‘the multitude contended with the nobility, and both sent ambassadors to Rome; for the men of power were desirous that their form of government might be changed into that of a Roman province; as were the multitude desirous to be under kings, as their fathers had been.’¹²¹

It is of course impossible to qualify the actual effects of being a ‘client kingdom’ rather than a province on the common people. The little evidence we have is insufficient and not unequivocal. When *provincia* Cappadocia was created in AD 17, following the death of the kingdom’s last monarch, the expected revenues for the imperial treasury were such that Tiberius decided to introduce a lower tax than was common elsewhere, ‘to encourage hope in the mildness of Roman sway’ (*quo mitius Romanum imperium speraretur*).¹²² But there were differences not only between kingdom and province, but also between kingdom and kingdom, as is clear from the description by Josephus (*Ant.* 17.2.2 [27–8]) of the way in which various members of the Herodian dynasty successively treated a Jewish colony settled by Herod the Great in the Batanaea area: immune from taxation under Herod, the inhabitants were subjected to paying taxes under Philip, ‘though it was not much and only for a short time’ (ὀλίγα τε καὶ ἐπ’ ὀλίγον αὐτοὺς ἐπράξατο), before the two Agrippas ‘did indeed grind them down’ (καὶ πάνυ ἐξετρύχωσαν αὐτούς).

Being hit (or not) in their pockets surely was one of the most important elements that helped the inhabitants of the Near East to appreciate that the status of the territory in which they happened to live mattered. But as we have seen, the population of the kingdoms and principalities in the region also understood that their world was populated by an instance even more powerful than their king or prince. This awareness that they too were very much part of the Roman world at large has brilliantly been assessed in terms of a ‘two-level monarchy’ by F. Millar.¹²³ One of these levels, the royal one, could of course be much more composite itself: for example, Pheroras owed his rule over Peraea both to Augustus and to his brother Herod the Great, ‘who had also, after requesting Caesar’s permission, appointed him tetrarch.’¹²⁴ And in the

121 *Jos. Ant.* 18.2.5 (53): διέστη δὲ τὸ πλῆθος πρὸς τοὺς γνωρίμους καὶ πρεσβεύουσιν ἀφ’ ἑκατέρου μέρους, οἱ μὲν δυνατοὶ μεταβάλλειν τὸ σχῆμα τῆς πολιτείας εἰς ἐπαρχίαν ἀξιοῦντες, τὸ πλῆθος δὲ βασιλεύεσθαι κατὰ τὰ πάτρια. Cf. *Tac. Ann.* 2.42.5: ‘the majority of men desired a Roman governor, and the minority a monarch’ (*plerisque Romanum, aliis regium imperium cupientibus*). As Speidel (2005), p. 93, cleverly remarks, “by peacefully sending embassies to Rome (and nowhere else, for that matter) and by presenting acceptable alternatives for the political future of their country to the Roman emperor the Commagenians proved that they were fully aware of the emperor’s role, of their own possibilities and of the procedures required to obtain what they were hoping for.”

122 *Tac. Ann.* 2.56.4, and cf. 2.42.4, with Millar (1993), p. 52. On the provincialization of Cappadocia see now Speidel (2008).

123 Millar (1996), with special attention to the effects this could have on the symbolic language in areas subject to two monarchs.

124 *Jos. BJ* 1.24.5 (483): ὃς αὐτὸν ἐποίησεν καὶ τετράρχην αἰτησάμενος παρὰ Καίσαρος. Cf. *Ant.* 15.10.3 (362): ‘Herod asked of Caesar a tetrarchy for his brother Pheroras, and allotted to him from his own kingdom a revenue of a hundred talents in order that, if something happened to him, the position of Pheroras might be safe, and that his sons might not seize possession of this’ (τῷ μὲν ἀδελφῷ Φερῶρα παρὰ Καίσαρος ἠτήσατο τετραρχίαν, αὐτὸς ἀπονείμας ἐκ τῆς

famous story of St Paul's escape from Damascus in a basket, it is said to have been the enigmatic 'ethnarch of the Nabataean king' (ὁ ἐθνάρχης Ἀρέτα τοῦ βασιλέως) who let his troops control the city in an attempt to capture him.¹²⁵

In a way, the notion of having more than one monarch could also be present in the bequest of their realm to Rome made by some kings, although this phenomenon is especially encountered elsewhere in the Roman world, and in the republican period. Perhaps most famously, in 133 BC Attalus III left Pergamum in his will to Rome;¹²⁶ in 96 BC, when the last king of Cyrenaica made Rome his heir, the Senate decided to annex the royal lands but to give freedom to the region's pentapolis – before creating a province proper a good twenty years later;¹²⁷ and Bithynia was left to Rome in 75/74 BC by Nicomedes IV (although Ariobarzanes I of Cappadocia is said – by the *Scholiasta Gronovianus* – to have acted briefly as a custodian).¹²⁸ By bequeathing his kingdom to Rome, the king effectually introduced the imperial power, or rather the sovereignty of the Roman people, into the hereditary line of his ancestors. It is unclear precisely what the advantage would have been for the deceased monarch, as blatant recognition of Rome's power was not always appreciated by all the king's subjects.

It is, then, not surprising that modern scholars have the tendency to view the kingdoms and principalities in the Roman world as a "part of provincial administration",¹²⁹ especially not as it is practically effective from a political perspective. In ca 9 BC, in the context both of a power struggle within the Nabataean kingdom, and of a conflict between Nabataeans and Herodians, Augustus is said to have been 'angry that Aretas (IV) had taken the throne before writing to him for permission' (ὁ δὲ τῷ μὴ τὸν Ἀρέταν ἐπιστεῖλαντα πρότερον αὐτῷ βασιλεύειν ὠργίζετο),¹³⁰ before the potentially explosive situation fizzled out: 'he received the envoys of Aretas and reproached him only with having been rash in not waiting to receive his kingdom from Caesar, but he accepted his gifts and confirmed him as ruler.'¹³¹ In AD 17 Germanicus, according to the *Tabula Siarensis*, 'had been sent as proconsul to the overseas provinces [of Asia] to give shape to them and to the king-

βασιλείας πρόσδοτον ἑκατὸν ταλάντων, ὡς εἰ καὶ τι πάσχοι, τὰ κατ' ἐκεῖνον ἀσφαλῶς ἔχειν καὶ μὴ τοὺς υἱοὺς αὐτῆς κρατεῖν). Not 'ethnarch', as in Millar (1993), p. 57, though correct at *ibid.*, p. 38.

125 2 *Cor.* 11:32, with Bowersock (1983), p. 68.

126 For ancient sources and discussion see Hansen (1971), p. 147–50; Hopp (1977), p. 125–31; Braund (1983); Gruen (1984), p. 592–610; Bernhardt (1985), p. 258–94; Virgilio (1993), p. 13f; Ferrary (1998), p. 821–2; Daubner (2003), p. 19–34 (with extensive bibliography).

127 Ancient sources and discussion in Niedermayer (1954), p. 33ff; Braund (1984), p. 129ff; Daubner (2003), p. 17–9. Cf. also Jones (1971), p. 358.

128 *Schol. Gron.* p. 316, ed. Stangl (Hildesheim, 1964), for which see Sullivan (1990), p. 35, with p. 345 n.19.

129 Goodman (1997), p. 110.

130 *Jos. Ant.* 16.9.4 (295); cf. 16.10.9 (353): 'But Caesar was not well disposed to Aretas because he had seized the throne by himself and with no reference to him' (Ἀρέτα δ' οὐκ εὐμενὴς ἦν Καῖσαρ, ὅτι τὴν ἀρχὴν μὴ δι' ἐκεῖνου, καθ' αὐτὸν δὲ ἔλαβεν).

131 *Jos. Ant.* 16.10.9 (355): δεξάμενος δὲ τοὺς παρὰ Ἀρέτα καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἐπιτιμήσας, ὡς προπετεία χρήσαιτο τῷ μὴ παρ' αὐτοῦ τὴν βασιλείαν ἀναμεῖναι λαβεῖν, τὰ τε δῶρα προσήκατο καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐβεβαίωσεν.

doms of the same area in accordance with the orders of Tiberius Caesar Augustus' (fr.I, lines 15ff: *proco<n>s(ul) missus in transmarinas pro[vincias Asiae] in conformandis iis regnisque eiusdem tractus ex mandatis Ti(berii) C<a>esaris Au[g(usti)]*). And in AD 63 Nero 'wrote to the tetrachs and kings and prefects and procurators and those praetors who controlled the bordering provinces that they should comply with Corbulo's orders'.¹³²

In contrast to Rome's provincial governors, kings and princes at least kept the right to *present* themselves as independent. The tension that this could evoke is well illustrated by Philo's description (*Flacc.* 5.30) of the arrival in Alexandria of Agrippa I, on his way from Rome to his kingdom in AD 38, and encapsulated in the words of those trying to stir up the prefect of Egypt, Flaccus, by telling him that 'the dignity of the honour and prestige which invest him surpasses yours (μείζονα τιμῆς καὶ εὐδοξίας ὄγκον ἢ σὺ περιβέβληται); he is attracting all men to him by the sight of his bodyguard of spearmen, decked in armour overlaid with gold and silver.' As F. Millar has stated, "this view of the relations of king and prefect is not a triviality, for such questions of prestige, precedence and diplomacy were integral to the unstable relations between Roman governors and local dynasts."¹³³ Herod's much studied building policy, which in a way turned him into the most 'Roman' of all city developers in the Near East, is a case in point too,¹³⁴ even if a large part of his activity was directed to projects carrying imperial names, above all the splendid city of Caesarea. In any case, self-representation as independent rulers always had to take place within limits: the famous 'conference' of dynasts at Tiberias, hosted by Agrippa I, was broken up and dissolved by the governor of *provincia* Syria, Marsus – apparently because it was conceived as a threat, with Marsus recognising their closeness in terms of familial relations.¹³⁵ But there was of course no shame in using that same knowledge, namely that the Near East formed a brew of familial and other relations, to its advantage.¹³⁶ A whole collection of Near Eastern princes, originally sent by their families as hostages to guarantee support of Rome, assembled in the empire's capital to reap the benefits of a classical education – in what O. Hekster refers to in his paper as Rome's "princely kindergarten".¹³⁷ 'Now all his surviving children are cared for

132 Tac. *Ann.* 15.25.3: *scribitur tetrarchis ac regibus praefectisque et procuratoribus et qui praetorum finitimas provincias regebant, iussis Corbulonis obsequi*. Cf. Millar (1993), p. 67–8; Heil (1997), p. 209–12.

133 Millar (1993), p. 57–8.

134 The bibliography is overwhelming, and we refer here only to Roller (1998), Lichtenberger (1999), Japp (2000) and Netzer (2006).

135 Jos. *Ant.* 19.8.1 (338–42). The story of the 'conference at Tiberias' is taken by Goodblatt (1987), p. 21–2, to be behind the popular tradition, found in later rabbinic sources (for references see *ibid.*, p. 16), that 'magnates from the Persian kingdom' visited the Jewish king.

136 The standard work for this prosopographical approach, though with no synthesis offered, is the posthumously published Sullivan (1990). Cf. the important review article by Butcher (1994).

137 One of those was the Edessan crown prince Abgar Phraates, who is known from his tombstone found in Rome. Luther (1998) has solved the riddle of the obscure mention in *CIL* VI 1797 of *filius rex principis Orrhenoru(m)* by explaining *filius rex* as a clumsy though original way of translating the Aramaic term for 'crown prince', known e.g. from Hatrean Aramaic, *pšgr(y)b'*. Cf. *DNWSI*, s.v. pšgrb.

in royal style, at public expense, in Rome' (τῶν μὲν οὖν παίδων ὅσοι περίεισιν ἐν Ῥώμῃ δημοσίᾳ βασιλικῶς τημελοῦνται), states Strabo (16.1.28) about Phraates, who was said to have voluntarily handed over four of his legitimate sons, two wives and four other sons to the Roman governor of Syria in order to deprive his enemies of the opportunity to replace his own dynasty.¹³⁸

Discussions in modern scholarship have mainly focused on methodological issues of how to approach the notion of 'client kingship'. But what it actually *meant*, in practical terms, to have one's kingdom allied to a superpower, is less often discussed. Some of the king's rights and duties are often touched on in the ancient sources, while others (such as providing internal order) are often simply taken for granted by modern scholars.¹³⁹ Above all, at many occasions Rome could count on substantial contributions to its military expeditions.¹⁴⁰ Whether this fact has any real bearing on the discussion of whether the 'client kingdoms' formed an actual part of the empire as such is not certain. In any case, the kings and princes all had standing armies, parts of which ended up in later phases in the auxiliary units of the imperial army.¹⁴¹ And this is true also of the famous archers from Palmyra, who are attested as regular auxiliary units from the late second century.¹⁴² However, as is the subject of the contribution by J.-B. Yon, Palmyra was of course no regular Near Eastern kingdom or principality (indeed, there were no kings at Palmyra before Odaenathus, and even then the nature of kingship is unclear) and there is no hard evidence that the city ever contributed troops to Rome. But there are some interesting references in Rabbinic sources that either hint at the involvement of Palmyrenes in the destruction of the Jewish Temple in AD 70 in general terms, or give rather explicit (and no doubt inflated) numbers of bowmen that Palmyra provided to Titus for the occasion. In a passage in the Palestinian Talmud (*Taanit* 4.5 XIX F-H), 'Rabbi Yohanan said "Fortunate is he who sees the fall of Palmyra, for the city was a partner in the destruction of the First Temple and in the destruction of the Second Temple, providing eight thousand bowmen in the destruction of the First Temple and eighty thousand bowmen in the destruction of the Second Temple".'¹⁴³ Whereas involvement of Palmyrene archers in the destruction of Solomon's Temple must surely be completely legendary, their participation on Rome's side in the Jewish war and the sack of Jerusalem and its

138 On hostage-taking by Rome, see now Allen (2006).

139 E.g. Kotula (2003), with n.9: "À l'intérieurs de leurs frontières, les rois vassaux veillaient au maintien de l'ordre public souvent menacé par des brigandages." See, however, Braund (1984), p. 91f, and esp. Butcher (2003), p. 87ff, and his analysis of 'friendly kings in Roman Syria'.

140 Well known examples are the military contributions by kings to Crassus' campaign against the Parthians and to Corbulo's expedition in Armenia. Cf. Plut. *Crass.* 19.1, Dio 40.16.1–2 (Crassus); Tac. *Ann.* 13.7.1, 37.1, 38.4 (Corbulo).

141 For some literature on the (as always) leading examples from Nabataea and the Herodian world see Bowsher (1989) and Gracey (1986) respectively.

142 Palmyrene units are listed alongside Cantabri, Dacians and Britains, with reference to their use of camels, by the author of the second- or third-century work *On Camp Fortifications*, often identified with Hyginus (29). *Numeri* were stationed in Dacia at least at three different sites, and also in Egypt (at two places) and in Algeria. The archives of the *Cohors XX Palmyrenorum*, found at Dura-Europos, make this the best known auxiliary unit in the Roman world. Cf. Kennedy (1994).

143 For the references to the various Rabbinic sources, see Kaizer (2004b), p. 568–9.

Temple in AD 70 may well have been historical. Indeed, Palmyrene involvement may be implied by Tacitus, when he adds to his list of the legions and auxiliaries awaiting Titus in Judaea that ‘there were also strong levies of Arabs, who felt for the Jews the hatred which is common between neighbours.’¹⁴⁴ In addition, Josephus records how Titus, when leaving with his legions, was ‘further attended by the contingents from the client kings, in greatly increased strength, and by a considerable body of Syrian irregulars.’¹⁴⁵ The latter (ἐπίκουροι) are thus explicitly put in contrast with the royal troops, which led F. Millar to argue that “they must have been provided ... by the various communities (but which, is not stated)”,¹⁴⁶ and it is certainly a possibility that they included bowmen from Palmyra.

Some of the papers in this volume ask explicit questions about the actual advantages of a relationship with Rome from the kings’ and princes’ point of view, since the more cunning royal characters aimed to secure help in a variety of political matters, especially in getting rid of political opposition. Not for the first time, the most evocative passage comes from Josephus (*Ant.* 14.6.4 (490)) and relates to Herod the Great, who convinced his Roman protector to kill Antigonus, the last Hasmonean king now in Roman captivity, to avoid a come-back to Jerusalem of the still popular dynast at a later stage: ‘because of this fear Herod gave Antony a large bribe and persuaded him to put Antigonus out of the way’ (ταῦτα φοβούμενος πολλοῖς χρήμασι πείθει τὸν Ἀντώνιον ἀνελεῖν Ἀντίγονον) – which made the triumvir ‘the first Roman who decided to behead a king’.¹⁴⁷ If it has always been clear that the Roman empire employed kings and princes in its own imperial ideology,¹⁴⁸ perhaps more attention ought to be given to the means by which the kingdoms and principalities employed Rome in *their*, royal, ideologies. By publicly accepting that another authority was even more potent and influential than they themselves, the kings and princes did perhaps not necessarily damage their prestige amongst the inhabitants of their realms (but see the comments made by A. Kropp). On the contrary, being able to advertise that Rome was on the royal side could have acted as a deterrent against revolts and usurpation attempts. It may also help us to understand how Agrippa (and indeed his new subjects) could deal with the fact that, soon after Caligula’s accession, he received a realm whose territories were geographically separated from each other.¹⁴⁹

Eventually, however, when the imperial predator decided that enough was enough, descendants of the royal houses of the Orient could preserve their title and

144 *Hist.*5.1: *et solito inter accolae odio infensa Iudaeis Arabum manus multique* (regardless of the implied incorrectness, or at least imprecision, of describing Palmyrenes as ‘Arabs’).

145 *BJ* 5.1.6 (42): πρὸς οἷς αἱ τε τῶν βασιλέων συμμαχία πολὺ πλείους καὶ συχνοὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς Συρίας ἐπίκουροι συνῆλθον.

146 Millar (1993), p. 76.

147 *Ant.* 15.1.2 (9): καὶ ἔδοξε μὲν οὗτος πρῶτος Ῥωμαίων βασιλέα πελεκίσαι. Cf. Dio 49.22.6: ‘But Antigonus he [Antony] bound to a cross and flogged – a punishment no other king had suffered at the hands of the Romans – and afterwards slew him’ (τὸν δ’ Ἀντίγονον ἐμαστίγωσε σταυρῷ προσδήσας, ὃ μηδεὶς βασιλεὺς ἄλλος ὑπὸ τῶν Ῥωμαίων ἐπεπόνθει, καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἀπέσφαξεν).

148 As noted e.g. by Braund (1984), p. 183.

149 Thus Millar (1993), p. 57.

royal dignity only as leading citizens in the cities of the Eastern provinces, like Philopappus, the grandson of the last monarch who reigned over Commagene, in Athens.¹⁵⁰ Relations between the various ‘royals’ following the demise of their ancestral possessions continued to be intensified via the conventional channels.¹⁵¹ It is certainly intriguing to note how the fascination in the Roman world with royalty persisted even after actual kingship ceased to be a factor. This ambiguity may lie behind the multiple stories (or should we call them ‘legends’?) of what happened to Zenobia after the fall of Palmyra. It seems clear that she was paraded in Aurelian’s triumph alongside Tetricus, the last ‘Gallic emperor’, but did she kill herself through starvation, or did she instead end up living in a pleasant villa?¹⁵² Of course we cannot longer know, but the fact that two such contradictory versions of the queen’s fate existed is telling enough.

THE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THIS VOLUME

This volume starts with an outlook on kingdoms and principalities from both the Roman and the Parthian point of view. O. Hekster brings the notion of ‘trophy kings’ into the picture, by discussing how the display of kings in Rome (whether as conquered subjects or as recipients of an upper-class Roman education) contributes to the creation of imperial ideology, while R. Fowler focuses on Josephus’ story of Izates, king of Adiabene, as a case-study of ‘client kingship’ in what he calls the ‘Parthian Near West’.

The next four papers deal with specific themes. A. Raggi, applying evidence both from the Near East and Asia Minor, discusses how the right of Roman citizenship spread amongst kings and princes in the late republic and the early empire. K. Dahmen asks in what way Near Eastern royalty could have ‘Rome in mind’ with regard to the production of their coinage, and analyses the different approaches in terms of the manifestation of their kingly power in a world dominated by Rome. T. Kaizer focuses on the role that the various inhabitants of the Near Eastern divine world could play in the ideology of the kingdoms and principalities themselves, and on how gods and goddesses were used to legitimate royal authority. Ll. Morgan’s contribution, which has a main focus on Bithynia, illuminates our discussions of kingdoms and principalities by Latin poetry, in a way that is of course (and unfortunately) not possible for the Levantine lands as such, and examines how Roman

150 As is well known from Plutarch’s *Table Talk*, the title βασιλεύς is used in jest (but perhaps not without a serious undertone) by Philopappus’ friends. Cf. Plut. *Mor.* 628A/B: ... Φιλοπάππου τοῦ βασιλέως ... Plutarch of course also dedicated another piece, *How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend*, to Philopappus, cf. *Mor.* 48E. On the sources concerning Philopappus see Facella (2006), p. 338–58, and for his funerary monument in detail Kleiner (1983).

151 Cf. Sullivan (1977d) on the intermarriage between the families of royal descendants turned leading citizens in the Roman East.

152 Triumph, cf. e.g. SHA *Tyr. trig.* 30.24–26; *Aur.* 33–4; starvation, cf. Zos. 1.59; villa, cf. SHA *Tyr. trig.* 30.27. See Hartmann (2001), p. 413–24, for discussion and all further references.

poetic responses to a ‘client kingdom’ were structured, with particular attention to the notion of *amicitia*.

What follows are five case-studies of individual regions, which show among other things how the imbalance in both the spread and the nature of our evidence can create very different impressions. R. Strootman views the so-called ‘Donations of Alexandria’ and the subsequent creation of a non-existing empire for Cleopatra and her children in the light of Hellenistic royal ideology, and prioritises the Egyptian queen’s role in the creation of the ‘Roman Near East’ as Augustus would come to inherit it. A. Primo studies the kingdom of Pontus in its post-Mithridatic phase, and analyses how both the memory of Mithridates Eupator and the liaison with the imperial power played a part in the validation of royal supremacy. M. Facella focuses on how the kings of Commagene aimed to obtain and protect their affiliations with Rome, while drawing attention to both the usefulness and the limits of the system of ‘client kingship’. A. Kropp studies the relationship between the royal house of Emesa and Rome from an archaeological perspective, and shows how friction between diverse cultural spheres can be expressed, even if subconsciously, in seemingly innocent buildings and artefacts relating to the local monarchy, precisely in order to avoid trouble with either Rome or the population of one’s own dominion. M. Sommer discusses the different attitudes to the ‘coming of Rome’ articulated within the kingdom of Edessa, on the other side of the Euphrates from Commagene, and how divisions within society were created between those who enthusiastically adjusted to the imperial power and those who strongly believed in the advantages of being, and hence remaining, a separate realm. We have no doubt that further case-studies would have added even more different angles to our discussion. In particular, discussions of Characene and of Hatra, two very different kingdoms which for most of their individual histories were situated within the Arsacid sphere of influence, in the Gulf region and in the northern-Mesopotamian Jazirah region respectively, would have been helpful for the study of R. Fowler’s ‘Parthian Near West’.¹⁵³

The two final papers deal with so-called ‘variations & alternatives’ to the system of ‘client kingship’. As a variation, J.-B. Yon analyses the enigmatic *absence* of royalty (at least before Odaenathus & Zenobia) at Palmyra, the oasis in the Syrian steppe once compellingly referred to as ‘une république de marchands’.¹⁵⁴ Another variation would have been Damascus, which was “an enclave which Rome ruled in principle but where it seems to have intervened only on occasion.”¹⁵⁵ The quasi-monarchic status of rabbis within the Jewish world could perhaps be labelled as an alternative in this context. The Mishnah treatise *Avot* makes a rather peculiar reference to ‘Rabbi Judah the Prince’ (2.2), and “that the title which had been adopted by Bar Kochba came back into use for the members of what became a sort of rabbinic

153 The Characene kingdom is dealt with in a most solid manner by Schuol (2000). The colloquium paper by L. Dirven, unfortunately not included here, was on ‘Hatra: political alliances and cultural inspiration’.

154 Will (1985).

155 Thus Millar (1993), p. 38. The colloquium paper by G. Roussel, unfortunately not included here, was on ‘Damascus – a Roman island in a sea of client kingdoms’.

dynasty is of great significance.”¹⁵⁶ U. Scharrer focuses on nomadic confederations as an alternative to ‘client kingdoms’, especially with regard to their social and political bonds with the desert dwellers of the Near East, and discusses the development of inter-nomadic unions and reliances in terms of the region’s ‘bedouinization’.¹⁵⁷ This last and by far longest paper opens up a whole ‘new world’ to Rome, and is hence a fitting conclusion to the volume.

Two final caveats and an expression of hope may be added. Firstly, as we have already stated, neither the individual papers nor the volume as a whole aim to provide a comprehensive, all-encompassing account of the relevant aspects of so-called ‘client kingship’: Braund (1984) remains the most useful tool in this respect. Secondly, as editors, we have decided not to enforce conformity of viewpoints between the individual contributors, but rather to encourage a healthy debate. Finally, it is very much hoped that we have at least succeeded in bringing together multifaceted papers that will further stimulate academic discussion of this most intriguing and evocative world of kingdoms and principalities in the Roman Near East.

156 Millar (1993), p. 383. The colloquium paper by J. Kirkpatrick, unfortunately not included here, was on ‘Rabbis and patriarchs: a Roman clientele in Galilee?’

157 For the development of the nomadic situation in North Africa, see the major study by Rachtel (1970).