

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface	7
I. THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF A BIPOLAR WORLD ORDER? SALT I AND EUROPEAN SECURITY, 1969–1972	
1. Introduction	9
2. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks: The Prehistory	17
3. The Nixon Administration, Europe and Nuclear Arms Control	21
4. NATO, Europe and the Preparation for the Preliminary SAL Talks	33
5. ‘Preliminary Talks’ and the Definition of Strategic Weapons	42
6. A Limited First Agreement	54
7. The US Modified Approach: The Struggle for Adoption	60
8. The May 20 Joint Declaration: The Common Platform	73
9. The Path to Moscow: Europe and SALT I	88
II. WHAT IS PARITY? EUROPE, SALT II & THE VLADIVOSTOK AGENDA IN THE ERA NIXON-FORD, 1972–1976	
1. Introduction	105
2. From SALT I to SALT II: The Congressional Approval	109
3. A New Beginning: The Preparation of the Geneva Talks	115
4. Beyond the Preliminary Talks: The Matrix for Strategic Arms Control	127
5. SALT and the ‘Year of Europe’, 1973	132
6. SALT and the Agreement to Prevent Nuclear War	141
7. SALT II and MBFR	156
8. Towards the Moscow Summit, June 1974	172
9. President Ford and the Avenue to Vladivostok	182
10. Vladivostok: The SALT II Agreement Illusion	193
11. NATO, MBFR and US Nuclear Weapons in Europe	200
12. The SALT Track: Cruise Missiles, Backfire and NATO Europe	206
13. SALT II: The Last Stand of the Ford Administration	216
III. CONCLUSION	228
Abbreviations	239
Bibliography	241
Index	246