The Libertarian Dilemma

According to incompatibilism, determinism precludesfree will. Libertarians are incompatibilists who alsobelieve in free will. Hence, they're committed tofree will's requiring the falsity ofdeterminism-indeterminism. The trouble is that thevery indeterminism which the libertarians need seeminimical to free will in that it is hard to see howindeterministic events can be under the agent'scontrol. This, in short, is the so-called LibertarianDilemma: free will seems incompatible withdeterminism, but it also seems incompatible withindeterminism-so, free will seems impossible. Thisbook offers an in-depth analysis of this problem andsome of the major contemporary attempts bylibertarians to forge a successful "way out" of it.In doing so, some central issues in the metaphysicsof free will are analyzed in detail, e.g., the logicof contemporary arguments for each of the horns ofthe dilemma; the problem of locating thelibertarians' requisite indeterminism; the nature of"agent causation" and its prospects for solving thedilemma. This book will be of interest tophilosophers or students of philosophy who have aninterest in the metaphysics of free will.