RADICAL CONSTRUCTIVISM (PDF)
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5 Reflection and Abstraction (p. 89-90) Shortly before the turn of the century, John Dewey wrote: ‘As adults we are constantly deceiving ourselves in regard to the nature and genesis of our mental experiences’ (McLellan and Dewey, 1908, p. 27). Much of his work aimed at exposing the deceptions. But the trend in psychology moved in another direction. What came was the behaviourist era. One of its remarkable features is that so many leaders and followers of that creed could claim to be empiricists, cite John Locke as their forefather, and get away with it. Had they read no further than the first chapter of Book II of his major work, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, they would have found some startling things. Right at the beginning there is a caution that might have made them a little more circumspect:
The understanding, like the eye, whilst it makes us see and perceive all other things, takes no notice of itself; and it requires art and pains to set it at a distance and make it its own object. (John Locke, 1690, Introduction, par.1)
Then, at the beginning of Book II, Locke makes it very clear that he does not intend to do without the ‘mind’ and its power of ‘reflection’. Paragraph 2 has the heading: ‘All Ideas come from Sensation or Reflection’, and paragraph 4 is entitled ‘The operations of our Minds’. It is there that Locke explains what he means by these terms:
By reflection then, in the following part of this discourse, I would be understood to mean, that notice which the mind takes of its operations, and the manner of them, by reason whereof there come to be ideas of these operations in the understanding. (Locke, 1690, Book II, Chapter I, par.4)
In our century, it was Jean Piaget who vigorously defended and expanded the notion of reflection. He lost no opportunity to distance himself from empiricists who denied the mind and its operations and wanted to reduce all
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knowing to a passive reception of objective sense data. Yet, he should not have found it difficult to agree with Locke’s division of ideas because it is not too different from his own division between figurative and operative knowledge. Both men, I have no doubt, would have agreed with Dewey about the risk of deceiving oneself by taking mental experiences as given. It is therefore with caution that I shall proceed to discuss, in the pages that follow, first my own view of reflection, abstraction, re-presentation, and the use of symbols, and then a tentative interpretation of Piaget’s view of reflection.
Reflection
If someone, having just eaten an apple, takes a bite out of a second one, and is asked which of the two tasted sweeter, we should not be surprised that the person could give an answer. Indeed, we would take it for granted that under these circumstances any normal person could make a relevant judgment. We cannot observe how such a judgment is made. But we can hypothesize some of the steps that seem necessary to make it. The sensations that accompanied the eating of the first apple would have to be remembered, at least until the question is heard.
Then they would have to be re-presented and compared (in regard to whatever the person called ‘sweetness’) with the sensations accompanying the later bite from the second apple. This re-presenting and comparing is a way of operating that is different from the processes of sensation that supplied the material for the comparison. Reflecting upon experiences is clearly not the same as having an experience. In 1795, a hundred years after Locke, Wilhelm von Humboldt jotted down a few aphorisms which, posthumously, his editors put under the heading ‘About Thinking and Speaking’. The first three aphorisms deal with reflection:
1 The essence of thinking consists in reflecting, i.e., in distinguishing what thinks
from what is being thought.
2 In order to reflect, the mind must stand still for a moment in its progressive
activity, must grasp as a unit what was just presented, and thus posit it as
object against itself.
3 The mind then compares the units, of which several can be created in that way,
and separates and connects them according to its needs. (Humboldt, 1907, p.
581)
I know of no better description of the mysterious capability that allows us to step out of the stream of direct experience, to re-present a chunk of it, and to look at it as though it were direct experience, while remaining aware of the fact that it is not. I call it mysterious, because, although we can all do it as easily as flipping a switch, we have not even the beginnings of a model (least of all an information processing model) that would suggest how it might be achieved.
Reflection
If someone, having just eaten an apple, takes a bite out of a second one, and is asked which of the two tasted sweeter, we should not be surprised that the person could give an answer. Indeed, we would take it for granted that under these circumstances any normal person could make a relevant judgment. We cannot observe how such a judgment is made. But we can hypothesize some of the steps that seem necessary to make it. The sensations that accompanied the eating of the first apple would have to be remembered, at least until the question is heard.
Then they would have to be re-presented and compared (in regard to whatever the person called ‘sweetness’) with the sensations accompanying the later bite from the second apple. This re-presenting and comparing is a way of operating that is different from the processes of sensation that supplied the material for the comparison. Reflecting upon experiences is clearly not the same as having an experience. In 1795, a hundred years after Locke, Wilhelm von Humboldt jotted down a few aphorisms which, posthumously, his editors put under the heading ‘About Thinking and Speaking’. The first three aphorisms deal with reflection:
1 The essence of thinking consists in reflecting, i.e., in distinguishing what thinks
from what is being thought.
2 In order to reflect, the mind must stand still for a moment in its progressive
activity, must grasp as a unit what was just presented, and thus posit it as
object against itself.
3 The mind then compares the units, of which several can be created in that way,
and separates and connects them according to its needs. (Humboldt, 1907, p.
581)
I know of no better description of the mysterious capability that allows us to step out of the stream of direct experience, to re-present a chunk of it, and to look at it as though it were direct experience, while remaining aware of the fact that it is not. I call it mysterious, because, although we can all do it as easily as flipping a switch, we have not even the beginnings of a model (least of all an information processing model) that would suggest how it might be achieved.
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Bibliographische Angaben
- 2002, Englisch
- ISBN-10: 0203454227
- ISBN-13: 9780203454220
- Erscheinungsdatum: 01.11.2002
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