War Termination as a Civil-Military Bargain (PDF)

question: when will states decide to cut their losses and withdraw from costly, protracted wars? He argues persuasively that the key factor driving this decision is a bargaining process between civilian and military leaders. This concise and insightful book challenges prevailing popular opinion and existing scholarship on the topic, and will surely be of great interest to political scientists, military historians, and policymakers alike.' Lindsey O'Rourke, Professor of International Politics, Boston College, USA

"In the last decade, the United States has extricated itself from two wars with great difficulty. Shawn T. Cochran's insightful book-deeply rooted in history, analytically careful, sensitive to the politics of narrative and authority-sheds light on war's end through the lens of civil-military relations. This is a valuable and original addition to the growing body of literature of war termination." - Ronald R. Krebs, Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota, USA and author of Narrative and the Making of US National Security (2015)

'Shawn T. Cochran's original and insightful work significantly advances our understanding of the domestic politics of war termination and its linkage to civil-military relations. His analysis shows how civil-military bargaining influences the political narrative, and thus the risk calculus of political leaders in wartime. The author advances a new conceptual framework of ideal types for the assignment of blame within the context of failed wars. According to Cochran, civil-military bargaining acts as an important influence for all political leaders in wartime but especially for new leaders, those who come to power after the start of a war. The author makes interesting counter-intuitive arguments, including that new leaders remain at risk for being blamed and punished for a failed war someone else started. Cochran also challenges the widely accepted argument that civilians will be more committed to ending a protracted war than military leaders, and the related assumption that protracted wars are more likely in states with weak civilian control over the armed forces. This study is highly recommended for academic and military professional readers and others interested in how wars end.' - Stephen J. Cimbala, Professor of Political Science, Pennsylvania State University, USA and author of Arms for Uncertainty: Nuclear Weapons in US and Russian Security Policy (2013)

'In this extremely timely study, Shawn T. Cochran offers a new perspective on why ending protracted wars is so difficult. His nuanced argument, emphasizing the effects of civil-military relationships and the politics of blame attribution, is a valuable contribution with which scholars of war termination, civil-military relations, and foreign policymaking more generally will need to grapple.' - Ryan Grauer, Professor of International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh, USA