Heuristics and Biases

Introduction: heuristics and biases then and now; Part I. Theoretical and Empirical Extensions: 1. Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: the conjunction fallacy in probability judgment; 2. Representativeness revisited: attribute substitution in intuitive judgment; 3. How alike is it versus how likely it is: a disjunction fallacy in probability judgments; 4. Imagining can heighten or lower the perceived likelihood of contracting a disease: the mediating effect of ease of imagery; 5. The availability heuristic revisited: ease of recall and content of recall as distinct sources of information; 6. Incorporating the irrelevant: anchors in judgments of belief and value; 7. Putting adjustment back in the anchoring and adjustment heuristic: differential processing of self-generate and experimenter-provided anchors; 8. Self anchoring in conversation: why language users don't do what they 'should'; 9. Inferential correction; 10. Mental contamination and the debiasing problem; 11. Sympathetic magical thinking: the contagion and similarity 'heuristics'; 12. Compatibility effects in judgment and choice; 13. The weighing of evidence and the determinants of confidence; 14. Inside the planning fallacy: the causes and consequences of optimistic time predictions; 15. Probability judgment across cultures; 16. Durability bias in affective forecasting; 17. Resistance of personal risk perceptions to debiasing interventions; 18. Ambiguity and self-evaluation: the role of idiosyncratic trait definitions in self-serving assessments of ability; 19. When predictions fail: the dilemma of unrealistic optimism; 20. Norm theory: comparing reality to its alternatives; 21. Counterfactual thought, regret, and superstition: how to avoid kicking yourself; Part II. New Theoretical Directions: 22. Two systems of reasoning; 23. The affect heuristic; 24. Individual differences in reasoning: implications for the rationality debate?; 25. Support theory: a nonextensional representation of subjective

Daniel Kahneman, geboren 1934 in Tel-Aviv, ist einer der weltweit einflussreichsten Kognitionspsychologen. Nach Stationen an der Hebrew University in Jerusalem und der University of British Columbia war er bis 1994 Professor an der University of California in Berkeley und hält seither die Eugene-Higgins-Professur für Psychologie an der Woodrow Wilson School der Princeton University. Kahnemann revolutionierte die Wissenschaft vom menschlichen Verhalten, indem er die Erkenntnisse der Hirnforschung und der Verhaltensbiologie zusammenführt und auf die Wirtschaftswissenschaften anwendet. Für seine Arbeit erhielt Kahneman zahlreiche Ehrenpreise namhafter Universitäten und wurde 2002 als erster Nicht-Ökonom mit dem Wirtschaftsnobelpreis ausgezeichnet.

Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment; offers a massive, state-of-the-art treatment of the literature, supplementing a similar book published two decades ago...This is an impressive book, full of implications for law and policy." Cass Sunstein, University of Chicago Law School "...the book should serve well as a reference work for researchers in cognitive science and as a textbook for advanced courses in that difficult topic. Philosophers interested in cognitive science will also wish to consult it." Metapsychology Online Review "Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment is a scholarly treat, one that is sure to shape the perspectives of another generation of researchers, teachers, and graduate students. The book will serve as a welcome refresher course for some readers and a strong introduction to an important research perspective for others." Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology