Inferentialism and Practical Reason

This essay elaborates and defends a certain broadorientation in the philosophy of mind - theinferentialism of Sellars and Brandom - and exploresthe striking consequences of that orientation for thefield of practical reason. Inferentialism aims tounderstand the significance of variousphilosophically important concepts in terms of theirrole in inference. The first part of the essay drawsa distinction between two types of practicalreasoning. It is argued that once we take acontextualist, non-foundationalist approach topractical reasoning, we realize that neither form ofreasoning is more fundamental or primary than theother. The second part examines three importantpractically-oriented mental states: intentions,evaluative beliefs, and desires, and arrives at novelaccounts of each. Intentions are analyzed aspractical commitments, the linchpin of practicalreasoning, and their deep connection with beliefs isrevealed. Desires are understood in terms ofintentions, reversing the usual direction ofanalysis, while evaluative beliefs are approached viaa distinction between acknowledging and attributingpractical states.