Strategy and Dynamics in Contests

Contents
Preface and Acknowledgements
1. An Introduction to Contests
1.1 A definition
1.2 Examples
1.3 The structure of the book
2. Types of Contests
2.1 The first-price all-pay auction
2.2 Additive noise
2.3 The Tullock contest
2.4 Experimental evidence
2.5 Evolutionary success
2.6 Summary
3. Timing and Participation
3.1 Endogenous timing
3.2 Voluntary participation
3.3 Exclusion
3.4 Delegation
3.5 Summary
4. Cost and prize structure
4.1 Choice of cost
4.2 The structure of prizes
4.3 Endogenous prizes
4.4 Summary
5. Externalities
5.1 State lotteries and financing public goods
5.2 A loser's preference about who wins
5.3 Personnel economics and sabotage
5.4 Information externalities and campaigning
5.5 Inter-group contests and free riding
5.6 Conclusions
6. Nested contests
6.1 Exogenous sharing rules
6.2 The choice of sharing rules
6.3 Intra-group conflict
6.4 A strategy of analysis of nested contests
7. Alliances
7.1 The alliance formation puzzle
7.2 Solutions to the alliance formation puzzle
7.3 Summary
8. Dynamic battles
8.1 The elimination tournament
8.2 The race
8.3 The tug-of-war
8.4 Iterating incumbency fights
8.5 Endogenous fighting
8.6 Summary: the discouragement effect
9. Conclusions

Kai A. Konrad, Professor of Economics, Freie Universität Berlin and Director, unit MPS, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)