A Priori Knowledge

Introduction
1. A Priori, Analyticity, and Implicit Definition
Empiricism, Analyticity, and the A Priori
Reductive and Non-Reductive Conceptions of Analyticity
Implicit Definition, Logical Truth, and the Recalcitrant A Priori
Problems with Implicit Definition
BonJour s Objection
Fodor and Lepore s Objection
Horwich s Objection
Hale and Wright s defence of the traditional connection
Logic and Convention
Coda
2. Realism about Logic
Introduction
Logical Principles, Justification and Epistemic Relativity
Objective Truth
Resnik s Attack
Wittgenstein on the necessity of 1 inch = 2.54 cm
and logical inference
Dummett s Objection
Rule Following considerations and the adoption of a convention
Summarising Remarks
Wright s Attack
3. Objective Knowledge
Introduction
What the Tortoise Said to Boghossian
What Boghossian would say to the Tortoise
Rule-circular Arguments
The Side-Argument
Rejecting the Side-Argument
First Horn: Simple Internalism and Rational Insight
Second Horn: Epistemic Responsibility and the Lack
of Epistemic Irresponsibility
Realism, the A priori and Rational Insight
Boghossian s Argument against Relativism
Epistemological Realism about Justification
Conclusion
4. Phenomenology and Rational Insight
Naturalism and Justification
Phenomenology, Justification, and Eidetic Seeing
Is Holism a Possibility for the Empiricist?
Intuition of Essences and the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction
Husserl s Conception of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction
Eidetic Variation
Passive synthesis and Concept Constitution
Knowledge of Reality and Conceptual Truth
Absolute vs Relative Objectivity
Are Conceptual Truths True?
Conclusion
References