Blackwell Companions to Philosophy / A Companion to Experimental Philosophy

Notes on Contributors 1. Introduction PART I: Experimental Philosophy: Past, Present and Future 2. Experimental Philosophy and the Philosophical Tradition Stephen Stich and Kevin Tobia 3. Philosophical Criticisms of Experimental Philosophy Timothy Williamson 4. Experimental Philosophy is Cognitive Science Joshua Knobe 5. Armchair-friendly Experimental Philosophy Kaija Mortensen and Jennifer Nagel 6. Going Positive by Going Negative: On Keeping X-Phi Relevant & Dangerous Jonathan M. Weinberg 7. Early Modern Experimental Philosophy Peter R. Anstey and Alberto Vanzo 8. Nietzsche and Moral Psychology Daniel Telech and Brian Leiter PART II: Areas of Research Free Will and Philosophy of Action 9. The Folk Concept of Intentional Action: Empirical Approaches Florian Cova 10. Traditional and Experimental Approaches to Free Will and Moral Responsibility Gunnar Björnsson and Derk Pereboom 11. Free Will and Experimental Philosophy Hoi-yee Chan, Max Deutsch and Shaun Nichols Moral and Political Philosophy 12. Solving the Trolley Problem Joshua D. Greene 13. The Adaptive Logic of Moral Luck Justin W. Martin and Fiery Cushman 14. Metaethics: Traditional and Empirical Approaches Alexandra Plakias 15. Aspects of Folk Morality: Objectivism and Relativism Hagop Sarkissian 16. The Behavior of Ethicists Eric Schwitzgebel and Joshua Rust 17. Experimental or Empirical Political Philosophy Nicole Hassoun 18. Ownership Rights Shaylene E. Nancekivell, J. Charles Millar, Pauline C. Summers and Ori Friedman Philosophy of Mind 19. Attributions of Consciousness Justin Sytsma 20. A Unified versus Componential View of Understanding Minds Lily Tsoi 21. The Group Mind in Commonsense Psychology Bryce Huebner 22. Synesthesia as a Challenge for Representationalism Berit Brogaard 23. Naturalistic Approaches to Creativity Dustin Stokes and Elliot Samuel Paul Epistemology 24. Knowledge Judgments in "Gettier" Cases John Turri 25. Experiments on Contextualism and Interest Relative Invariantism Ángel

Justin Sytsma is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand. As a practitioner of experimental philosophy, he uses empirical methods to conduct his research into the areas of the philosophy of psychology and the philosophy of mind. He is co-author of The Theory and Practice of Experimental Philosophy(2016) and editor of Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Mind (2014). He has also published in a variety of peer reviewed journals, including Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Philosophical Studies, Philosophy of Science, Journal of Consciousness Studies, and Philosophy Compass. Wesley Buckwalter is Banting Postdoctoral Fellow in the Department of Philosophy and the Philosophical Science Laat the University of Waterloo, Canada. He completed his PhD in Philosophy at the City University of New York Graduat Center, USA. He has published dozens of articles in epistemology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science on a wide range of topics including knowledge, belief, assertion, luck, intuition, methodology, functionalism, consciousness, emotion, and fiction.