Epistemic Responsibility for Undesirable Beliefs

1 Epistemic Responsibility: An Overview

1.1 The Trouble with "Facts"

1.2 How Epistemology Undermines Responsibility

1.3 Exculpatory Ignorance

1.4 The Problem of Culpability1.5 Three Questions                        



2 What is Undesirable Belief?2.1 Truth and Undesirability



2.2 Whose Undesirability?

2.3 The Intersectionality of Oppression

2.4 Finding Fact in the Midst of Conflicting Value

2.5 Transformational Criticism and Undesirability2.6 The Challenge of Intellectual Authority



2.7 Undesirable Belief and Exculpatory Reasons

2.8 Taking Social Acceptability Seriously

      

3 Can There Be Epistemic Responsibility?          3.1 Epistemic Voluntarism? Belief as Habits of Action



3.2 The Intractability of Undesirability

3.3 Salvaging Epistemic Responsibility

3.4 Doxastic Intentions and Epistemic Responsibility

3.5 Doxastic Influence and Responsibility3.6 Epistemic Humility/Epistemic Hubris



3.7 Epistemic Communities and the Possibility of Voluntarism

3.8 Joint Epistemic Responsibility 

4 What About the Exculpatory Effects of Ignorance?      

4.1 Varieties of Ignorance and Exculpation

4.2 Immersion and Responsibility within Socially Constructed Ignorance

4.3 Deliberate Ignorance and Responsibility4.4 Anti-Individualism and Epistemic Heroism



4.5 Holding Out for Epistemic Heroes

4.6 When Should We Know? 

4.7 Whose Ignorance?  Whose Responsibility?                     

5 It's Not My Fault

5.1 Epistemic Individualism Be Damned

5.2 Epistemic Dependence and Individual Responsibility  5.3 Epistemic Bubbles, Echo Chambers, and Becoming a Cognitive Newborn 

5.4 It May Really Not Be My Fault

Deborah K. Heikes is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Alabama in Huntsville.