Formal and Transcendental Logic

of levels within apophantics. Clear evidence and distinct evidence.- a.Modes of performing the judgment. Distinctness and confusion.- b.Distinctness and clarity.- c.Clarity in the having of something itself and clarity of anticipation.- § 17. The essential genus, "distinct judgment," as the theme of "pure analytics".- § 18. The fundamental question of pure analytics.- § 19. Pure analytics as fundamental to the formal logic of truth. Non-contradiction as a condition for possible truth.- § 20. The principles of logic and their analogues in pure analytics.- § 21. The evidence in the coinciding of "the same" confused and distinct judgment. The broadest concept of the judgment.- § 22. The concept defining the province belonging to the theory of apophantic forms, as the grammar of pure logic, is the judgment in the broadest sense.- 2. Formal apophantics, formal mathematics.- § 23. The internal unity of traditional logic and the problem of its position relative to formal mathematics.- a.The conceptual self-containedness of traditional logic as apophantic analytics.- b.The emerging of the idea of an enlarged analytics, Leibniz's "mathesis universalis," and the methodico-technical unification of traditional syllogistics and formal mathematics.- § 24. The new problem of a formal ontology. Characterization of traditional formal mathematics as formal ontology.- § 25. Formal apophantics and formal ontology as belonging together materially, notwithstanding the diversity of their respective themes.- § 26. The historical reasons why the problem of the unity of formal apophantics and formal mathematics was masked.- a.Lack of the concept of the pure empty form.- b.Lack of knowledge that apophantic formations are ideal.- c.Further reasons, particularly the lack of genuine scientific inquiries into origins.- d.Comment on Bolzano's position regarding the idea of formal ontology.- § 27. The introduction of the idea of formal ontology in the Logische Untersuchungen.- a.The first constitutional investigations of categorial objectivities, in the Philosophie der Arithmetik.- b.The way of the "Prolegomena" from formal apophantics to formal ontology.- 3. Theory of deductive systems and theory of multiplicities.- § 28. The highest level of formal logic: the theory of deductive systems; correlatively, the theory of multiplicities.- § 29. The theory of multiplicities and the formalizing reduction of the nomological sciences.- § 30. Multiplicity-theory as developed by Riemann and his successors.- §31. The pregnant concept of a multiplicity-correlatively, that of a "deductive" or "nomological" system-clarified by the concept of "definiteness".- § 32. The highest idea of a theory of multiplicities: a universal nomological science of the forms of multiplicities.- § 33. Actual formal mathematics and mathematics of the rules of the game.- § 34. Complete formal mathematics identical with complete logical analytics.- § 35. Why only deductive theory-forms can become thematic within the domain of mathesis universalis as universal analytics.- a.Only deductive theory has a purely analytic system-form.- b.The problem of when a system of propositions has a system-form characterizable as analytic.- § 36. Retrospect and preliminary indication of our further tasks.- b. Phenomenological clarification of the two-sidedness of formal logic as formal apophantics and formal ontology.- 4. Focusing on objects and focusing on judgments.- § 37. The inquiry concerning the relationship between formal apophantics and formal ontology; insufficiency of our clarifications up to now.- § 38. Judgment-objects as such and syntactical formations.- § 39. The concept of the judgment broadened to cover all formations produced by syntactical actions.- § 40. Formal analytics as a playing with thoughts, and logical analytics. The relation to possible application is part of the logical sense of formal mathesis.- §41. The difference between an apophantic and an ontological focusing and the problem of clarifying that difference.- § 42. Solution of this problem.- a.Judging directed, not to the judgment, but to the thematic objectivity.- b.Identity of the thematic object throughout changes in the syntactical operations.- c.The types of syntactical object-forms as the typical modes of Something.- d.The dual function of syntactical operations.- e.Coherence of the judging by virtue of the unity of the substrate-object that is being determined. Constitution of the "concept" determining the substrate-object.- f. The categorial formations, which accrue in the determining, as habitual and inter subjective possessions.- g. The objectivity given beforehand to thinking contrasted with the categorial objectivity produced by thinking - Nature as an illustration.- § 43. Analytics, as formal theory of science, is formal ontology and, as ontology, is directed to objects 119.- § 44. The shift from analytics as formal ontology to analytics as formal apophantics.- a.The change of thematizing focus from object- provinces to judgments as logic intends them.- b.Phenomenological clarification of this change of focus.- ?. The attitude of someone who is judging naïvely-straightforwardly.- ?. In the critical attitude of someone who intends to cognize, supposed objectivities as supposed are distinguished from actual objectivities.- ?. The scientist's attitude: the supposed, as supposed, the object of his criticism of cognition.- § 45. The judgment in the sense proper to apophantic logic.- § 46. Truth and falsity as results of criticism. The double sense of truth and evidence.- 5. Apophantics, as theory of sense, and truth-logic.- § 47. The adjustment of traditional logic to the critical attitude of science leads to its focusing on the apophansis.- § 48. Judgments, as mere suppositions, belong to the region of senses. Phenomenological characterization of the focusing on senses.- § 49. The double sense of judgment (positum, proposition).- § 50. The broadening of the concept of sense to cover the whole positional sphere, and the broadening of formal logic to include a formal axiology and a formal theory of practice.- §51. Pure consequence-logic as a pure theory of senses. The division into consequence-logic and truth- logic is valid also for the theory of multiplicities, as the highest level of logic.- § 52. "Mathesis pura" as properly logical and as extralogical. The "mathematics of mathematicians".- § 53. Elucidations by the example of the Euclidean multiplicity.- § 54. Concluding ascertainment of the relationship be-tween formal logic and formal ontology.- ?.The problem.- b.The two correlative senses of formal logic.- c. The idea of formal ontology can be separated from the idea of theory of science.- II / From Formal to Transcendental Logic.- 1. Psychologism and the laying of a transcendental foundation for logic.- § 55. Is the development of logic as Objective-formal enough to satisfy even the idea of a merely formal theory of science ?.- § 56. The reproach of psychologism cast at every consideration of logical formations that is directed to the subjective.- §57. Logical psychologism and logical idealism.- a. The motives for this psychologism.- b. The ideality of logical formations as their making their appearance irreally in the logico-psychic sphere.- § 58. The evidence of ideal objects analogous to that of individual objects.- § 59. A universal characterization of evidence as the giving of something itself.- § 60. The fundamental laws of intentionality and the universal function of evidence.- § 61. Evidence in general in the function pertaining to all objects, real and irreal, as synthetic unities.- § 62. The ideality of all species of objectivities over against the constituting consciousness. The positivistic misinterpretation of Nature is a type of psychologism.- § 63. Originally productive activity as the giving of logical formations themselves; the sense of the phrase, their production.- § 64. The precedence of real to irreal objects in respect of their being.- §65. A more general concept of psychologism.- § 66. Psychologistic and phenomenological idealism. Analytic and transcendental criticism of cognition.- § 67. The reproach of psychologism as indicating failure to understand the necessary logical function of transcendental criticism of cognition.- § 68. Preliminary view of our further problems.- 2. Initial questions of transcendental-logic: problems concerning fundamental concepts.- § 69. Logical formations given in straightforward evidence. The task of making this evidence a theme of reflection.- § 70. The sense of the demanded clarifications as scientific inquiry into constitutive origins.- a.Shift of intentional aimings and equivocation.- b.Clarification of the separate fundamental concepts belonging to the several logical disciplines as an uncovering of the hidden methods of subjective formation and as criticism of these methods.- §71. Problems of the foundations of science, and constitutional inquiry into origins. Logic called on to lead.- § 72. The subjective structures as an Apriori, correlative to the Objective Apriori. Transition to a new level of criticism.- 3. The idealizing presuppositions of logic and the constitutive criticism of them.- § 73. Idealizing presuppositions of mathematical analytics as themes for constitutive criticism. The ideal identity of judgment-formations as a constitutional problem.- § 74. Idealities of And-so-forth, of constructable infinities, and the subjective correlate of these idealities.- § 75. The law of analytic contradiction and its subjective version.- § 76. Transition to the problems of the subjective that arise in connexion with the logic of truth.- § 77. The idealizing presuppositions contained in the laws of contradiction and excluded middle.- § 78. Transmutation of the laws of the "modus ponens" and the "modus tollens" into laws pertaining to subjective evidences.- § 79. The presupposition of truth in itself and falsity in itself; the presupposition that every judgment can be decided.- § 80. The evidence pertaining to the presupposition of truth, and the task of criticizing it.- § 81. Formulation of further problems.- 4. Evidential criticism of logical principles carried back to evidential criticism of experience.- § 82. Reduction of judgments to ultimate judgments. The primitive categorial variants of something; the primitive substrate, individual.- § 83. Parallel reduction of truths. Relation of all truths to an antecedent world of individuals.- § 84. The hierarchy of evidences; the intrinsically first evidences those of experience. The pregnant concept of experience.- § 85. The genuine tasks of so-called judgment-theory. The sense-genesis of judgments as a clue in our search for the hierarchy of evidences.- § 86. The evidence of pre-predicative experience as the intrinsically primary theme of transcendental judgment-theory. The experiential judgment as the original judgment.- § 87. Transition to evidences at higher levels. The question of the relevance of the cores to the evidence of materially filled universalities and to the evidence of formal universalities.- § 88. The presupposition implicit in the law of analytic contradiction: Every judgment can be made distinctly evident.- § 89. The possibility of distinct evidence.- a.Sense as judgment and as "judgment-content" Ideal existence of the judgment presupposes ideal existence of the judgment-content.- b.The ideal existence of the judgment-content de-pends on the conditions for the unity of possible experience.- § 90. Application to the principles of truth-logic: They hold good only for judgments that are senseful in respect of content.- § 91. Transition to new questions.- 5. The subjective grounding of logic as a problem belonging to transcendental philosophy.- § 92. Clarification of the sense in which Objective logic is positive.- a.The relatedness of historically given logic to a real world.- b.Its naive presupposing of a world ranks logic among the positive sciences.- § 93. Insufficiency of attempts to criticize experience, beginning with Descartes.- a.Naive presupposition of the validity of Objective logic.- b.Missing of the transcendental sense of the Cartesian reduction to the ego.- c.The grounding of logic leads into the all-em- bracing problem of transcendental phenomenology.- 6. Transcendental phenomenology and intentional psychology. The problem of transcendental psychologism.- § 94. Every existent constituted in the subjectivity of consciousness.- § 95. Necessity of starting, each from his own subjectivity.- § 96. The transcendental problems of intersubjectivity and of the intersubjective world.- a.Intersubjectivity and the world of pure experience.- b.The illusion of transcendental solipsism.- c.Problems at higher levels concerning the Objective world.- d.Concluding observations.- § 97. Universal philosophic significance of the method that consists in uncovering constitution in consciousness.- § 98. Constitutional investigations as a priori.- § 99. Psychological and transcendental subjectivity. The problem of transcendental psychologism.- § 100. Historico-critical remarks on the development of transcendental philosophy and, in particular, on transcendental inquiry concerning formal logic.- 7. Objective logic and the phenomenology of reason.- §101. The subjective foundation of logic is the transcendental phenomenology of reason.- § 102. The relatedness of traditional logic to the world, and the inquiry concerning the character of the "ultimate" logic, which furnishes norms for its own transcendental clarification.- § 103. Absolute grounding of cognition is possible only in the all-embracing science of transcendental subjectivity, as the one absolute existent.- § 104. Transcendental phenomenology as self-explication on the part of transcendental subjectivity.- § 105. Preparations for concluding our transcendental criticism of logic. The usual theories of evidence misguided by the presupposition of absolute truth.- § 106. Further criticisms of the presupposition of absolute truth and the dogmatistic theories of evidence.- § 107. Delineation of a transcendental theory of evidence as an effective intentional performance.- a.The evidence of external (sensuous) experience.- b.The evidence of "internal" experience.- c.Hyletic Data and intentional functionings. The evidence of Data occurring in internal time.- d.Evidence as an apriori structural form of consciousness.- Conclusion.- § 1. The articulation of predicative judgments 293.- § 2. Relatedness to subject-matter in judgments.- § 3. Pure forms and pure stuffs.- § 4. Lower and higher forms. Their sense-relation to one another.- § 5. The self-contained functional unity of the self- sufficient apophansis. Division of the combination- forms of wholes into copulatives and conjunctions.- § 6. Transition to the broadest categorial sphere.- a.Universality of the combination-forms that we have distinguished.- b.The distinctions connected with articulation can be made throughout the entire categorial sphere.- c.The amplified concept of the categorial proposition contrasted with the concept of the proposition in the old apophantic analytics.- § 7. Syntactical forms, syntactical stuffs, syntaxes.- § 8. Syntagma and member. Self-sufficient judgments, and likewise judgments in the amplified sense, as syntagmas.- § 9. The "judgment-content" as the syntactical stuff of the judgment qua syntagma.- § 10. Levels of syntactical forming.- § 11. Non-syntactical forms and stuffs - exhibited within the pure syntactical stuffs.- § 12. The core-formation, with core-stuff and core-form.- § 13. Pre-eminence of the substantival category. Substantiation.- § 14. Transition to complications.- § 15. The concept of the "term" in traditional formal logic.- § 1. Active judging, as generating objects themselves, contrasted with its secondary modifications.- § 2. From the general theory of intentionality.- a.Original consciousness and intentional modification. Static intentional explication. Explication of the "meaning" and of the meant "itself " The multiplicity of possible modes of consciousness of the Same.- b.Intentional explication of genesis. The genetic, as well as static, originality of the experiencing manners of givenness. The "primal instituting" of "apperception" with respect to every object- category.- c. The time-form of intentional genesis and the constitution of that form. Retentional modification. Sedimentation in the inconspicuous substratum (unconsciousness).- § 3. Non-original manners of givenness of the judgment.- a. The retentional form as the intrinsically first form of "secondary sensuousness". The livingly changing constitution of a many-membered judgment.- b.Passive recollection and its constitutional effect for the judgment as an abiding unity.- c.The emergence of something that comes to mind apperceptionally is analogous to something coming to mind after the fashion of passive recollection.- § 4. The essential possibilities of activating passive manners of givenness.- § 5. The fundamental types of originally generative judging and of any judging whatever.- § 6. Indistinct verbal judging and its function.- § 7. The superiority of retentional and recollectional to apperceptional confusion; secondary evidence in confusion.- § 1. The goal of formal non-contradiction and of formal consequence. Broader and narrower framing of these concepts.- § 2. Relation of the systematic and radical building of a pure analytics, back to the theory of syntaxes.- § 3. The characterization of analytic judgments as merely "elucidative of knowledge" and as "tautologies".- § 4. Remarks on "tautology" in the logistical sense, with reference to §§ 14-18 of the main text. (By Oskar Becker.).