Haji, I: Freedom and Value
(Sprache: Englisch)
This original book examines free will's relevance to personal well-being, and its relevance to the intrinsic value of possible worlds. The book should be of interest to those working on intrinsic value, personal well-being, moral obligation, and free will.
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This original book examines free will's relevance to personal well-being, and its relevance to the intrinsic value of possible worlds. The book should be of interest to those working on intrinsic value, personal well-being, moral obligation, and free will.
Klappentext zu „Haji, I: Freedom and Value “
Freedom of the sort implicated in acting freely or with free will is important to the truth of different sorts of moral judgment, such as judgments of moral responsibility and those of moral obligation. Little thought, however, has been invested into whether appraisals of good or evil presuppose free will. This important topic has not commanded the attention it deserves owing to what is perhaps a prevalent assumption that freedom leaves judgments concerning good and evil largely unaffected. The central aim of this book is to dispute this assumption by arguing for the relevance of free will to the truth of two sorts of such judgment: welfare-ranking judgments or judgments of personal well-being (when is one's life intrinsically good for the one who lives it?), and world-ranking judgments (when is a possible world intrinsically better than another?). The book also examines free will's impact on the truth of such judgments for central issues in moral obligation and in the free will debate. This book should be of interest to those working on intrinsic value, personal well-being, moral obligation, and free will.
Inhaltsverzeichnis zu „Haji, I: Freedom and Value “
Chapter 1. Introduction: On the Values of Lives and Worlds 1.1. The Focus of Inquiry: The Freedom of Axiological Judgments 1.2. Synopsis Chapter 2. Attitudinal Hedonism 2.1. Simple Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism 2.2. Some Merits of Attitudinal Hedonism 2.2.1. A Problem Concerning Nonexistent Pleasures 2.2.2. A Problem Concerning False Pleasures 2.2.3. A Problem Concerning Base Pleasures Chapter 3. Freedom-sensitive Versions of Attitudinal Hedonism 3.1. The Freedom of Attitudes 3.2. Neo's Case 3.3. In Support of Freedom-Sensitive Attitudinal Hedonism 3.4. Varieties of Freedom-Sensitive Attitudinal Hedonism 3.3.1. Robust Freedom-Sensitive Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism 3.3.2. Asymmetric Freedom-Sensitive Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism 3.3.3. Symmetric Freedom-Sensitive Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism 3.3.4. Pain Adjusted Freedom-Sensitive Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism 3.5. Freedom and Well-Being 3.6. Objections and Replies 3.6.1. Welfare Relevant versus World Relevant Factors 3.6.2. Freedom and Manipulation 3.6.3. Freedom and Unbidden Pleasures 3.6.4. Unfree Pleasures and Value Chapter 4. Pleasure, Desert, and Welfare 4.1. Pleasure and Desert 4.2. Why be Drawn to Simple Desert-Adjusted Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism? 4.2.1. Ross's Two-Worlds Objection 4.3. On the Value of Worlds and Lives 4.4. The Freedom of Our Decisions 4.5. Authentic versus Inauthentic Springs of Action 4.6. Authentic Springs of Action and Value 4.7. Freedom, Desert, andValue 4.8. Freedom and the Value of Action-Based Pleasures Chapter 5. Authentic Springs of Action 5.1. Authenticity and Welfare 5.2. A Comparison with Noggle's Account 5.3. Some Objections and Responses 5.4. Authenticity and Well-Being: An Objection 5.5. Authenticity and Well-Being: Another Objection Chapter 6. Incompatibilism, Compatibilism, Desert, and Value 6.1. Subject's-Desert Adjusted Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism, Lives, and Worlds 6.2. Some Source Incompatibilist Presuppositions 6.3. Some Principles 6.4. The Argument from
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Control 6.5. The Argument from Desert 6.6. The Argument from Authenticity 6.7. Compatibilism, Well-Being, and the Value of Worlds 6.8. Libertarianism, Well-Being, and the Value of Worlds Appendix A: On Determinism, Randomness, and Desert Chapter 7. Freedom, Obligation, and the Good 7.1. Obligation, Freedom, and the Value of Worlds 7.2. Determinism, Alternative Possibilities, and Obligation 7.3. Ross's Objection Revisited 7.4. A Remaining Problem Concerning Freedom with Subject's Desert- Adjusted Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism 7.5. Varieties of Freedom-Sensitive World-Ranking Axiologies 7.6. On the Value of Worlds and Moral Obligation 7.7. The Value of Worlds and the Repugnant Conclusion 7.7.1. An Objection to Totalism: The Repugnant Conclusion 7.7.2. A Response to Parfit Concerns Regarding Totalism 7.8. Inauthenticity and Obligation 7.8.1. Freedom's Bearing on the Value of Worlds 7.8.2. Inauthenticity and the Undoing of Moral Obligation 7.9. Conclusion Chapter 8.
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Bibliographische Angaben
- Autor: Ishtiyaque Haji
- 2008, X, 206 Seiten, Maße: 16,3 x 24,1 cm, Gebunden, Englisch
- Verlag: Springer Netherland
- ISBN-10: 1402090765
- ISBN-13: 9781402090769
- Erscheinungsdatum: 22.11.2008
Sprache:
Englisch
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