Reforming the European Union

List of Figures xi List of Tables xiii Acknowledgments xv Introduction 1 Chapter One: From the European Convention to the Lisbon Agreement and Beyond: A Veto Player Analysis By George Tsebelis 28 1.1 Judges, Bureaucrats, and the Democratic Deficit 32 1.2 Veto Players and Their Policy and Institutional Implications 38 1.3 A Qualified Majority in the Council: To What Extent Does It Impede Decision Making? 45 1.4 Battles over the "Default Solution" 54 1.5 Conclusion 60 Chapter Two: Revealing Constitutional Preferences in the European Convention By Sven-Oliver Proksch 62 2.1 Revealing Preferences: Cosponsorship of Amendments in the European Convention 64 2.2 Data and Method 68 2.3 Results: Giscard's Central Position within the Conflict Space 70 2.4 Conclusion 75 Chapter Three: The Art of Political Manipulation in the European Convention By George Tsebelis and Sven-Oliver Proksch 76 3.1 Limiting the Number of Amendments 78 3.2 Shaping Amendments 88 3.3 The Absence of Voting 94 3.4 Discussion and Conclusion 95 Appendix 3A 97 Appendix 3B 99 Chapter Four: Actors and Positions on the Reform of the Treaty of Nice By Thomas Konig and Daniel Finke 103 4.1 The Process of Reform: From the Convention to the Ratification Stage 107 4.2 The Two-dimensional Space and the Location of the Political Leaders' Positions 111 4.3 Other Actors and the Cohesiveness of the Political Leaders' Positions 116 4.4 Representing and Delegating the Position of Political Leaders 120 4.5 The Ratifiers: Median Voters and Political Parties 125 4.6 Summary 127 Chapter Five: Why (Unpopular) Leaders Announce Popular Votes By Thomas Konig and Daniel Finke 129 5.1 Political Leaders and Their Announcements of Referendums 132 5.2 Ratification Hurdles in Each Country 134 5.3 Decisions along the Ratification Path: A Strategic Consideration 137 5.4 The Empirical Analysis of Referendum Announcements 142 5.5 From Announcing Referendums to a Reflection Period and Reform Crisis 147 Chapter Six: Principals

Daniel Finke is assistant professor of political science at the University of Heidelberg. Thomas Konig is professor of political science and director of the Research Centre for the Political Economy of Reforms at the University of Mannheim. Sven-Oliver Proksch is a research fellow at the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research. George Tsebelis is the Anatol Rapoport Collegiate Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan.

"This excellent book will command a wide audience in EU politics, comparative politics, and international relations. The book's theoretical ideas, derived from rational choice institutionalism, are at the cutting edge of modern political science, its empirical methods are highly innovative, and the normative implications about the future of the European Union are significant."--Simon Hix, London School of Economics and Political Science