The Handbook of Market Design
(Sprache: Englisch)
This Handbook brings together the latest research on applied market design. It surveys matching markets: environments where there is a need to match large two-sided populations to one another, such as law clerks and judges or patients and kidney donors.
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This Handbook brings together the latest research on applied market design. It surveys matching markets: environments where there is a need to match large two-sided populations to one another, such as law clerks and judges or patients and kidney donors.
Klappentext zu „The Handbook of Market Design “
Economists often look at markets as given, and try to make predictions about who will do what and what will happen in these markets. Market design, by contrast, does not take markets as given; instead, it combines insights from economic and game theory together with common sense and lessons learned from empirical work and experimental analysis to aid in the design and implementation of actual markets In recent years the field has grown dramatically, partially because of the successful wave of spectrum auctions in the US and in Europe, which have been designed by a number of prominent economists, and partially because of the increase use of the Internet as the platform over which markets are designed and run There is now a large number of applications and a growing theoretical literature. The Handbook of Market Design brings together the latest research from leading experts to provide a comprehensive description of applied market design over the last two decades In particular, it surveys matching markets: environments where there is a need to match large two-sided populations to one another, such as medical residents and hospitals, law clerks and judges, or patients and kidney donors It also examines a number of applications related to electronic markets, e-commerce, and the effect of the Internet on competition between exchanges.
Inhaltsverzeichnis zu „The Handbook of Market Design “
- Introduction
- Part I: General Principles
- 1: Alvin E. Roth: What Have We Learned From Market Design?
- 2: Gary E. Bolton: Not Up To Standard: Stress Testing Market Designs for Misbehavior
- 3: Paul Klemperer: Using and Abusing Auction Theory
- Part II: Cases
- Section II.A: Matching Markets
- 4: Tayfun Sönmez and Utku Ünver: Market Design for Kidney Exchange
- 5: Atila Abdulkadiroglu: School Choice
- 6: Aytek Erdil and Haluk Ergin: Improving Efficiency in School Choice
- 7: Sarbartha Bandyopadhyay, Fedor Iskhakov, Terence Johnson, Soohyung Lee, David McArthur, John Rust, Joel Watson, and John Watson: Can the Job Market for Economists be Improved?
- 8: Joshua S. Gans and Scott Stern: Designing Markets for Ideas
- 9: Ashok Rai and Tomas Sjöström: Redesigning Microcredit
- Section II.B: Auctions
- 10: Paul Klemperer: The Product-Mix Auction: A New Auction Design for Differentiated Goods
- 11: Robert Day and Paul Milgrom: Optimal Incentives in Core-Selecting Auctions
- 12: Peter Cramton, Samuel Dinkin, and Robert Wilson: Auctioning Rough Diamonds: A Competitive Sales Process for BHP Billiton's Ekati Diamonds
- Section II.C: E-Commerce
- 13: Axel Ockenfels and Alvin E. Roth: Ending Rules in Internet Auctions: Design and Behavior
- 14: Andrew Byde and Nir Vulkan: Designing Markets for Mixed Use of Humans and Automated Agents
- 15: Benjamin Edelman: The Design of Online Advertising Markets
- 16: Tuomas Sandholm: Very-Large-Scale Generalized Combinatorial Multi-Attribute Auctions: Lessons from Conducting 60 Billion of Sourcing
- 17: Nir Vulkan and Chris Priest: Designing Automated Markets for Communication Bandwith
... mehr
Section II.D: Law Design
18: Alon Klement and Zvika Neeman: A Mechanism Design Approach to Legal Problems
19: Aviad Heifetz, Ella Segev, and Eric Talley: Legislation with Endogenous Preferences
Part III: Experiments
20: Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton, Emel Filiz-Ozbay, Nathaniel Higgins, Erkut Y. Ozbay, and Andrew Stocking: Common-Value Auctions with Liquidity Needs: An Experimental Test of a Troubled Assets Reverse Auction
21: Martin Dufwenberg and Uri Gneezy: Information Disclosure in Auctions: An Experiment
22: Elena Katok: Experiments with Buyer-Determined Procurement Auctions
23: Uri Gneezy, Ernan Haruvy, and Hadas Yaffe: The Inefficiency of Splitting the Bill
Part IV: Competing Designs
24: Michael Peters: Competing Mechanisms
25: Nir Vulkan and Zvika Neeman: Three Case Studies of Competing Designs in Financial Markets
... weniger
Autoren-Porträt
Alvin E. Roth was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics 2012 for his work on market design. He received his B.S. from Columbia University in 1971 and Ph.D. from Stanford University in 1974. He taught at the University of Illinois from 1974-82, at the University of Pittsburgh from 1982-98, at Harvard University from 1998 to 2012, and he now teaches at Stanford. Nir Vulkan is an Economics Professor at the Säid Business School and a Fellow of Worcester College, Oxford University. He has written many articles on market design and is author of The Economics of E- Commerce (Princeton University Press, 2003). He has worked with many software and e-commerce companies designing markets mainly on the Internet, which are used by humans and software agents. His algorithms for automated trading have been used by hedge funds to trade futures in markets all over the world.
Zvika Neeman is a microeconomic and game theorist who specializes in mechanism design. He teaches at the Berglas School of Economics at Tel Aviv University. Prior to that, he held positions at Boston University and at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
Bibliographische Angaben
- 2015, 706 Seiten, Maße: 17 x 24,6 cm, Kartoniert (TB), Englisch
- Herausgegeben: Nir Vulkan, Alvin E. Roth, Zvika Neeman
- Verlag: Oxford University Press
- ISBN-10: 0198743777
- ISBN-13: 9780198743774
- Erscheinungsdatum: 23.10.2015
Sprache:
Englisch
Pressezitat
The breadth of innovative research on market designs should open the readers imagination to the vast possibilities in this exciting subject area. Mark S. Rzepczynski, CFA Institute Publications
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