The Low Interest Rate Policy of the European Central Bank. Are European Savers being expropriated?
(Sprache: Englisch)
Central banks around the world have lowered their key interest rates to historical lows and implemented large asset purchase programs in the past few years. Within the scientific and, most recently, also increasingly in the political debate, the nominal...
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Central banks around the world have lowered their key interest rates to historical lows and implemented large asset purchase programs in the past few years. Within the scientific and, most recently, also increasingly in the political debate, the nominal interest rate is mainly the subject of discussion. The question is often raised whether saving and retirement provision are still worthwhile for private households, especially in Germany. In this context it is often ignored or not considered that the purchasing power of the nominal interest rates fluctuates considerably with the inflation rate. Inflation-adjusted real interest rates are therefore decisive for the actual income from financial assets and crucial for the savings and investment behavior. This study, therefore, shall play ist part to investigate scientifically the influence and correlation of low and negative key interest rates on yield levels of selected asset classes within the sphere of influence of the European Central Bank. In this context, the mainly populist question is also answered whether savers are expropriated slowly.
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Text Sample:Chapter 3.2 Principles and Objectives:
The principle of independence is the main concept regarding the fulfillment of the tasks of the ECB. This principle is very important compared to other major central banks, especially in regard to the guarantee of fiscal stability of the EU and the integration of candidate countries. The principle of independence can be distinguished into five types of independence (Scheller 2004, pp. 121 ff.).
Article 108 of the treaty establishing the European Community declares the institutional independence of the ECB. This article stipulates explicitly that, "when exercising their powers and carrying out their tasks and duties, neither the ECB nor an NCB nor any member of their decision-making bodies shall seek or take instructions from Community institutions or bodies, from any government of a Member State or from any other body. The Community institutions and bodies and the governments of the Member States undertake to respect this principle and not to seek to influence the members of the decision-making bodies of the ECB or of the national central banks in the performance of their tasks." (EC Treaty (Maastricht consolidated version), Article 107). Although the article makes it illegal to accept instructions from any body, be it public or private, this article does not preclude an exchange or seeking of information or dialogue with bodies mentioned in the article (Scheller 2004, p. 123). Article 123 of the Lisbon Treaty can also be subsumed under the principle of institutional independence. This article states that the ECB cannot grant loans to public budget, respectively states and therefore the ECB cannot finance deficits in the budget of the community or a Member State (The Lisbon Treaty, Article 123).
The principle of legal independence is concluded by the legal personality of the ECB. Its legal independence allows the ECB to take action before the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to protect their rights when they are
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threatened by a Community institution or a Member State (Scheller 2004, p. 122).
To underpin the institutional independence of the ECB, its statutes should protect the personal independence of the members of the decision-making bodies of the ECB. These include inter alia long tenures of managerial staff. According to that, members of the Executive Board have a term of eight years, where a reappointment is not possible and the NCB governors have a term of at least five years, where a reappointment is possible. Moreover, a member of the Governing Council can only be deposed from office for 'serious' reasons at the request of the Governing Council or the Executive Board by the European Court of the Office. This also means that no member of the decision-making bodies of the ECB may be dismissed due to a discretionary decision based on his previous performance of central bank-specific tasks (Scheller 2004, p. 123).
Functional and operational independence shall ensure that the ECB is free to decide regarding the method with which it wants to carry out its mission. Furthermore, the ECB is solely responsible for monetary policy and owns the monopoly of issuing bank notes. This means that no legal tender can be created against the will of the ECB and the ECB thus has complete control over the monetary base in the euro area. To carry out its monetary policy, a wide range of instruments are available. These include normative powers, as well as the right to impose and enforce sanctions, if regulations and decisions of the ECB are transgressed. However, the ECB is bound by article 127, paragraph 1 of the TFEU and the ECB Statute to the defined objectives. Additional mandates must be assessed critically (ibid.).
The ECB has its own budget and can decide on its own about the allocation of its resources. Due to this financial independence, private banks have only minimal influence on the ECB. The central banks of the euro zone countries hold 70.39% of the capital of the ECB and
To underpin the institutional independence of the ECB, its statutes should protect the personal independence of the members of the decision-making bodies of the ECB. These include inter alia long tenures of managerial staff. According to that, members of the Executive Board have a term of eight years, where a reappointment is not possible and the NCB governors have a term of at least five years, where a reappointment is possible. Moreover, a member of the Governing Council can only be deposed from office for 'serious' reasons at the request of the Governing Council or the Executive Board by the European Court of the Office. This also means that no member of the decision-making bodies of the ECB may be dismissed due to a discretionary decision based on his previous performance of central bank-specific tasks (Scheller 2004, p. 123).
Functional and operational independence shall ensure that the ECB is free to decide regarding the method with which it wants to carry out its mission. Furthermore, the ECB is solely responsible for monetary policy and owns the monopoly of issuing bank notes. This means that no legal tender can be created against the will of the ECB and the ECB thus has complete control over the monetary base in the euro area. To carry out its monetary policy, a wide range of instruments are available. These include normative powers, as well as the right to impose and enforce sanctions, if regulations and decisions of the ECB are transgressed. However, the ECB is bound by article 127, paragraph 1 of the TFEU and the ECB Statute to the defined objectives. Additional mandates must be assessed critically (ibid.).
The ECB has its own budget and can decide on its own about the allocation of its resources. Due to this financial independence, private banks have only minimal influence on the ECB. The central banks of the euro zone countries hold 70.39% of the capital of the ECB and
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Autoren-Porträt von Heiko Schmolke
Heiko Schmolke holds a bachelor's degree in business administration and engineering from the Technical University of Berlin and an MBA from the FOM University of Applied Sciences for Economics and Management in Germany. He works as a management consultant in Germany for several years and has extensive expertise in the field of finance and trading. He has solid professional experience as an analyst and has published various articles and books on topics of finance and politics, e.g. the impact of U.S. Fed bond purchases on inflation since 2008 or the impact of US labor market reports and FOMC meetings on the foreign exchange market.
Bibliographische Angaben
- Autor: Heiko Schmolke
- 2017, 144 Seiten, 31 Abbildungen, Maße: 19 x 27 cm, Kartoniert (TB), Englisch
- Verlag: Anchor Academic Publishing
- ISBN-10: 3960671199
- ISBN-13: 9783960671190
Sprache:
Englisch
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