The Origin of Competitive Strength
Fifty Years of the Auto Industry in Japan and the U.S.
(Sprache: Englisch)
When the war ended on August IS, 1945, I was a naval engineering cadet at the Kure Navy Yard near Hiroshima, Japan. A week later, I was demobi lized and returned to my home in Tokyo, fortunate not to find it ravaged by firebombing. At the beginning of...
Voraussichtlich lieferbar in 3 Tag(en)
versandkostenfrei
Buch (Kartoniert)
53.49 €
26 DeutschlandCard Punkte
sammeln
- Lastschrift, Kreditkarte, Paypal, Rechnung
- Kostenlose Rücksendung
- Ratenzahlung möglich
Produktdetails
Produktinformationen zu „The Origin of Competitive Strength “
Klappentext zu „The Origin of Competitive Strength “
When the war ended on August IS, 1945, I was a naval engineering cadet at the Kure Navy Yard near Hiroshima, Japan. A week later, I was demobi lized and returned to my home in Tokyo, fortunate not to find it ravaged by firebombing. At the beginning of September, a large contingent of the Ameri can occupation forces led by General Douglas MacArthur moved its base from Yokohama to Tokyo. Near my home I watched a procession of American mili tary motor vehicles snaking along Highway 1. This truly awe-inspiring cavalcade included jeeps, two-and-a-half-ton trucks, and enormous trailers mounted with tanks and artillery. At the time, I was a 21-year-old student in the Machinery Section of Engineering at the Tokyo Imperial University. Watching that mag nificent parade of military vehicles, I was more than impressed by the gap in industrial strength between Japan and the U. S. That realization led me to devote my whole life to the development of the Japanese auto industry. I wrote a small article concerning this incident in Nikkei Sangyo Shimbun (one of the leading business newspapers in Japan) on May 2, 1983. The English translation of this story was carried in the July 3, 1983 edition of the Topeka Capital-Journal and the September 13, 1983 issue of the Asian Wall Street Journal. The Topeka Capital-Journal headline read, "MacArthur's Jeeps Were the Toyota Catalyst.
Inhaltsverzeichnis zu „The Origin of Competitive Strength “
- Prologue - The Japanese Automobile Industry Gets on Its Feet- MITI's Automotive Strategy in the 1950s
- Rise of Independent Two-Wheeled and Three-Wheeled Vehicle Manufacturers
- The Shelving of the "People's Car" Plan
- Recognition of the Need to Develop a Car for the Masses
- The First Definition of Productivity, and the Difference between Japan and the U.S
I. Toyota Moves into the Fast Lane
I-1. The Big Time - Launching Toyota's American Operation
I-2. Fifteen Long Years Establishing an American Base
I-3. Overtaking the Datsun Bluebird
I-4. Failure in Introducing an American-Style Distribution System
I-5. The Product Planning Office at Toyota Motor Sales: Placing the Customer First
I-6. Corolla vs. Sunny
I-7. Foresight Behind the Development of the One-Box Van
I-8. The Shock of My Years with General Motors
I-9. The Revolutionary Celica Ordering System
I-10. Development of Distribution Systems
II. A Flagship Car
II-1. MITI's Shadowboxing
II-2. Grappling with Emission Control Measures
II-3. Look-Alike Cars: The Hidden Key to Success or Failure
II-4. The God of Sales: President Kamiya
II-5. Overtaking the Datsun Bluebird
II-6. The Lexus
III. Management of the Automobile Industries in Japan and the U.S. in the Postwar Period
III-1. Characteristics of the Automobile Industry
- Capital Investment
- Production, Sales and Collection
- Results
- Fund-Raising
III-2. The Evils of the Big Three's Oligopoly
III-3. Comparison of the Management Performance of Toyota and GM in the Postwar Period
- Growth Potential (Growth Rate of Sales in Value)
- Profit Margin (Ratio of Profit Margin to Sales)
- Liquidity (Current Ratio)
- Long-Term Stability (Rate of Owned Capital)
- Vitality (Rate of Total Assets Turnover)
- Financial Strength of Owned Capital (Self-financing Ratio)
- Long-Term Profitability (Return on Equity)
- Productivity (Labor Productivity)
III-4. Conclusion
IV. The Success of NUMMI
IV-1. Growing Popularity of Posts in
... mehr
NUMMI
IV-2. An Unrealized Partnership between Toyota and Ford
IV-3. Talks Quickly Shift to Toyota and GM
IV-4. A Strong Desire to Achieve a Joint Venture
IV-5. The Understanding and Cooperation of the UAW
IV-6. Universality of the Toyota Production System is Proven
V. GM's Tough Fight
V-1. The Big Three's Late Comprehension of the Small-Car Market
V-2. Corvair's Setback
V-3. The Vega and the Death of Ford-style Mass Production System
V-4. Chevette's Success
V-5. The Tragedy of the X-Car
V-6. The Collapse of the J-Car
V-7. The Rejection of the S-Car
V-8. The Vision of Saturn
V-9. Hamtramck Plant Versus Tahara Plant
V-10. The Key Reasons for Failure
- Underestimating the imported small-car market
- Innovation vs. mass production
- It is people who operate high-tech equipment
- GM's policy of supremacy at any cost, and corporate ills
VI. The Rebirth of GM
VI-1. Coup d'Etat by Outside Directors
VI-2. Management Reform Under President Jack Smith
VI-3. Overhaul of Product Planning
- Use of New Technology
- Products for the Lifestyle Market
- Fewer Vehicle Platforms
VI-4. Production Startup Problems
VI-5. Lean Production
VI-6. Enhancing GM's Technological Potential
VI-7. Independence of Parts Suppliers
VI-8. The New Purchasing Philosophy
VI-9. Rebuilding the Domestic Sales Structure
- Program Sales
- Preserving the Oldsmobile Division
- The Customer Satisfaction Program
- GM Dealer Standards
- NAO Standards for GM Dealers
VI-10. Stepping Up Overseas Operations
VII. Lean Production and the Challenge to the "World Car"
VII-1. Ripple Effect of the MIT Study
- The Shock Felt by European Automakers
- Response by Ford Motor Company
- Response by General Motors
VII-2. The Toyota Production System and the Ford Production System
VII-3. Competition and Production Leveling
- Competitiveness
- Production Leveling
VII-4. GM Europe and Lean Production
VII-5. World Car's Conditions
- Epilogue
- The Arrival of the Black Ships
- The Automobile Industry and the Bubble Economy
- Developing the Technology Basis
- Addendum
- Japan-U.S. Auto Trade Negotiations
- Zero-Emission Vehicles
- The Progress of Electronic Science's Application to the Auto Industry
- Computer-Aided Logistic Support (CALS)
- Intelligent Transportation System (ITS)
- Increased Competition of Mini-Cars
- About the Author
- Reference
IV-2. An Unrealized Partnership between Toyota and Ford
IV-3. Talks Quickly Shift to Toyota and GM
IV-4. A Strong Desire to Achieve a Joint Venture
IV-5. The Understanding and Cooperation of the UAW
IV-6. Universality of the Toyota Production System is Proven
V. GM's Tough Fight
V-1. The Big Three's Late Comprehension of the Small-Car Market
V-2. Corvair's Setback
V-3. The Vega and the Death of Ford-style Mass Production System
V-4. Chevette's Success
V-5. The Tragedy of the X-Car
V-6. The Collapse of the J-Car
V-7. The Rejection of the S-Car
V-8. The Vision of Saturn
V-9. Hamtramck Plant Versus Tahara Plant
V-10. The Key Reasons for Failure
- Underestimating the imported small-car market
- Innovation vs. mass production
- It is people who operate high-tech equipment
- GM's policy of supremacy at any cost, and corporate ills
VI. The Rebirth of GM
VI-1. Coup d'Etat by Outside Directors
VI-2. Management Reform Under President Jack Smith
VI-3. Overhaul of Product Planning
- Use of New Technology
- Products for the Lifestyle Market
- Fewer Vehicle Platforms
VI-4. Production Startup Problems
VI-5. Lean Production
VI-6. Enhancing GM's Technological Potential
VI-7. Independence of Parts Suppliers
VI-8. The New Purchasing Philosophy
VI-9. Rebuilding the Domestic Sales Structure
- Program Sales
- Preserving the Oldsmobile Division
- The Customer Satisfaction Program
- GM Dealer Standards
- NAO Standards for GM Dealers
VI-10. Stepping Up Overseas Operations
VII. Lean Production and the Challenge to the "World Car"
VII-1. Ripple Effect of the MIT Study
- The Shock Felt by European Automakers
- Response by Ford Motor Company
- Response by General Motors
VII-2. The Toyota Production System and the Ford Production System
VII-3. Competition and Production Leveling
- Competitiveness
- Production Leveling
VII-4. GM Europe and Lean Production
VII-5. World Car's Conditions
- Epilogue
- The Arrival of the Black Ships
- The Automobile Industry and the Bubble Economy
- Developing the Technology Basis
- Addendum
- Japan-U.S. Auto Trade Negotiations
- Zero-Emission Vehicles
- The Progress of Electronic Science's Application to the Auto Industry
- Computer-Aided Logistic Support (CALS)
- Intelligent Transportation System (ITS)
- Increased Competition of Mini-Cars
- About the Author
- Reference
... weniger
Bibliographische Angaben
- Autor: Akira Kawahara
- 2012, Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 1998, XXXIV, 278 Seiten, Maße: 15,5 x 23,5 cm, Kartoniert (TB), Englisch
- Verlag: Springer, Berlin
- ISBN-10: 4431684212
- ISBN-13: 9784431684213
Sprache:
Englisch
Kommentar zu "The Origin of Competitive Strength"
0 Gebrauchte Artikel zu „The Origin of Competitive Strength“
| Zustand | Preis | Porto | Zahlung | Verkäufer | Rating |
|---|
Schreiben Sie einen Kommentar zu "The Origin of Competitive Strength".
Kommentar verfassen