Theory of Science

Themselves and by Ideas Possessed.- § 49. Differentiation of the Concept of an Idea in Itself from Some Related Concepts.- § 50. Justification of this Concept.- § 51. That this Concept Is Already Encountered in Others (Subsection 1).- § 54. Ideas in Themselves Have No Existence.- § 55. Ideas in Themselves Are neither True nor False (-A).- 56. Parts and Content of an Idea in Itself (-A).- § 58. Closer Examination of the Most Notable Ways in which Ideas Are Compounded.- § 60. Concrete and Abstract Ideas (-A).- § 61. There Must also Be Simple Ideas.- § 63. Are the Parts of an Idea the Same as the Ideas of the Parts of Its Object?.- § 64. Are the Parts of an Idea the Same as the Ideas of Its Object's Properties? (-A).- § 66. The Concept of the Extension of an Idea (-A).- § 67. There Are also Objectless Ideas (+A).- § 68. There Are also Ideas that Have Only a Finite Set of Objects, and Singular Ideas as Well (-A).- § 70. Real and Imaginary Ideas (+A).- § 71. Two Consequences (+A).- § 72. What the Author Understands by Intuitions (-A).- § 73. What Is It that the Author Calls Concepts and Mixed Ideas?.- § 75. Some Remarks on the Difference between the Ways in which Intuitions and Concepts Are Designated.- § 78. Differences among Concepts with Respect to Content and Extension (+A 1-2, to p. 356,1. 12, of the German text).- § 80. Ideas of Qualities and Relations (-A).- § 84. Concepts of Sets and Sums (-A).- § 86. Concepts of Unity, Plurality and Universality.- § 87. Concepts of Quantity, Both Finite and Infinite (-A).- § 90. Symbolic Ideas (-A).- § 91. There Are No Two Completely Identical Ideas. Similar Ideas (+ A 1-2).- § 92. Relations among Ideas with Respect to Their Content (-A).- § 93. Relations among Ideas with Respect to Their Breadth (-A).- § 94. Relations among Ideas with Respect to Their Objects (-A).- § 95. Special Kinds of Compatibility: (a) Inclusion (+A).- § 96. (b) The Relationship of Mutual Inclusion, or Equivalence (-A).- § 97. (c) The Relationship of Subordination (-A).- § 98. (d) The Relationship of Intersection or Concatenation (-A).- § 102. No Finite Set of Standards Is Sufficient to Measure the Breadths of All Ideas.- § 103. Particular Kinds of Incompatibility among Ideas (-A).- § 108. How the Relationships Discussed in §§93ff Can Be Extended to Objectless Ideas as Well (+A).- § 120. On the Rule that Content and Extension Stand in an Inverse Relationship.- Volume Two.- Two / On Propositions in Themselves.- § 122. No Proposition in Itself Is an Existent.- § 123. Every Proposition Necessarily Contains Several Ideas. Its Content (-A).- § 124. Every Proposition Is Capable of Being Considered as a Component of Another Proposition, or Even of a Mere Idea.- § 125. Every Proposition Is either True Or False and True or False in All Times and at All Places.- § 126. Three Components that Are Undeniably Found in a Large Number of Propositions.- § 127. Which Components Does the Author Assume for All Propositions?.- § 130. The Extension of a Proposition Is Always the Same as the Extension of Its Base (-A).- § 133. Conceptual Propositions and Empirical Propositions (+A).- § 137. Various Propositions about Ideas: (a) Assertions of the Denotative Character of an Idea.- § 138. (b) Denials of the Denotative Character of an Idea (-A).- § 139. (c) Further Propositions that Define the Extension of an Idea More Closely.- § 146. Objectless and Denotative, Singular and General Propositions.- § 147. The Concept of the Validity of a Proposition.- § 148. Analytic and Synthetic Propositions (+A).- § 154. Compatible and Incompatible Propositions (-A).- § 155. Special Types of Compatibility: (a) The Relation of Derivability (+A).- § 156. (b) The Relation of Equivalence (+A).- § 157. (c) The Relationship of Subordination.- § 158. (d) The Relationship of Concatenation.- § 159. Special Types of Incompatibility (-A).- § 160. Relations among Propositions Resulting from Consideration of How Many True or False Propositions there Are in a Set (+A).- § 161. The Relationship of Comparative Validity or the Probability of a Proposition with Respect to Other Propositions (+A2 from p. 189, 1. 10, of the German text).- § 162. The Relation of Ground and Consequence.- § 167. Propositions which Assert a Relation of Probability.- § 168. Propositions which Assert a Relation of Ground and Consequence (Subsection 3).- § 174. Propositions of the Form: n A are B (+A).- § 179. Propositions with If and Then (+A).- §182. Propositions Containing the Concept of Necessity, Possibility or Contingency (-A).- Three / On True Propositions.- § 198. The Concept of a Ground-Consequence Relationship between Truths (-A).- § 199. Can the Inference Rule also Be Counted among the Partial Grounds of a Conclusion? (-A).- § 200. Is the Relation of Ground and Consequence Subordinate to that of Derivability?.- § 203. Only Truths Are Related as Ground and Consequence (Subsection 1).- § 204. Can Something Be Ground and Consequence of Itself? (-A).- § 205. Are Ground and Consequence in Each Case only a Single Truth or a Set of Several Truths?.- § 206. Can One Ground Have a Variety of Consequences or One Consequence a Variety of Grounds?.- § 207. Can One Regard the Consequence of a Part as the Consequence of the Whole?.- § 209. Can a Truth or a Whole Set of Truths Be both Ground and Consequence in One and the Same Relation? (-A).- § 210. Can a Set of Several Grounds Be Regarded as the Ground of a Set of Several Consequences?.- §211. Is there a Rank Order among the Parts of the Ground or of the Consequence?.- § 213. Can the Consequence of the Consequence Be Considered a Consequence of the Ground? (-A).- § 214. Can Every Truth Be Regarded not only as Ground but also as Consequence of Others? (-A).- § 215. Is there More than One Basic Truth? (+A).- § 216. Does the Process of Mounting up from Consequences to Its Grounds Have to Come to an End for Every Given Truth?.- § 217. What the Author Understands by Subsidiary Truths.- § 218. No Truth Can Be a Subsidiary Truth of Itself.- § 220. What Kind of Pictorial Representation Can Be Given for the Relationship that Prevails between Truths with Respect to Ground and Consequence?.- § 221. Some Criteria for Determining whether Certain Truths Have the Relationship of Dependence (+A).- Four / On Inferences.- § 223. Content and Purpose of this Chapter (+A).- § 224. Some Rules by which Conclusions to Given Premises Can Be Sought out.- § 243. Continuation [Assertions about Numbers].- Volume Three.- Three / Theory of Knowledge.- One / On Ideas.- § 270. Concept of an Idea in the Subjective Sense (-A).- § 271. There Is an Idea in Itself Attached to Every Subjective Idea (+A).- § 272. Every Subjective Idea Is Something Real, but only as an Attribute of a Substance.- § 285. Naming Our Ideas (Subsections 1-2).- Two / On Judgments.- § 290. The Concept of a Judgment.- § 291. Some Properties that Belong to All Judgments (-A).- § 292. What We Call a Single Judgment, and when We Say of Several Judgments that They Are Like or Unlike.- § 294. Classifications of Judgments that Arise from Classifications of Propositions with the Same Names.- § 298. Does Every Judgment Leave a Trace of Itself behind after It Has Passed away?.- § 300. Mediation of a Judgment by Other Judgments (-A).- § 303. How We Do Arrive at Our Most General Empirical Judgments and how We Can Arrive at Them (-A).- § 306. Survey of the Most Noteworthy Activities and States of Our Mind that Concern the Business of Making Judgments (-A).- Three / The Relationship of our Judgments to the Truth.- § 307. More Precise Definition of the Concepts: Knowledge, Ignorance and Error (-A).- § 309. What Is the Basis of the Possibility of Error and what Circumstances Promote Our Errors' Occurrence?.- § 314. Are there Definite Limits to Our Capacity for Knowledge? (+A).- Volume Four.- Five / Theory of Science Proper.- One / General Theory.- § 395. The Supreme Principle of All Theory of Science (-A).- § 401. A Proper Scholarly Treatise Must also Indicate the Objective Connection between Truths, as far as Possible.- Four / On the Propositions which should Occur in a Scholarly Treatise.- § 525. Explaining a Truth's Objective Ground (-A).- § 530. Proofs by Reduction to Absurdity (Subsection 1).- § 557. How to Prove a Statement Specifying the Composition of an Idea.- § 558. How the Proof that a Definition of a Given Proposition Is Correct Must Be Carried out (-A).- B Excerpts from Bolzano's Correspondence.- Letter to J. E. Seidel, 26 January 1833 (Manuscript in Krajské muzeum v Ceských Bud?jovicích; transcription by Jan Berg).- Letter to M. J. Fesl, 8 February 1834 (Manuscript in Literární ar chív Památníku národního písemnictví v Praze; published in Wissenschaft und Religion im Vormärz. Der Briefwechsel Bernard Bolzanos mit Michael Josef Fesl (ed. by E. Winter and W. Zeil), Berlin 1965, p. 58,1. 4 - 1. 3 f.b.).- Letter to F. Exner, 22 November 1834 (Manuscript in Österreichische Nationalbibliothek Wien; published in Der Briefwechsel B. Bolzano's mit F. Exner (ed. by E. Winter), Bernard Bolzano's Schriften, vol. 4, Prague 1935, p. 62,1. 32 - p. 67, 1. 38).- Letter to J. P. Romang, 1 May 1847 (Manuscript in the same archive as Letter to M. J. Fesl (above); published in Philosophisches Jahrbuch der Görresgesellschaft, vol. 51, Fulda 1938, p. 50,1. 5f.b. - p. 53, 1. 16).- Letter to R. Zimmermann, 9 March 1848 (Manuscript in the same archive as Letter to M. J. Fesl (above); transcription by Jan Berg).- Letter to F. P?íhonský, 10 March 1848 (Manuscript in the same archive as Letter to M. J. Fesl (above); published in E. Winter: Der Böhmische Vormärz in Brief en B. Bolzanos an F. P?ihonskí, Berlin 1956, p. 285,1. 1 - 1. 16).- A. Works by Bolzano.- 1. Works on Logic, Epistemology and Methodology of Science.- 2. Works on Mathematics.- B. Works on Bolzano.- 1. General Works.- 2. Biographies.- 3. Logic.- 4. Mathematics.- 5. Metaphysics.- 6. Theology.- 7. Social Philosophy.- 8. Aesthetics.- Name Index.