Truth and Belief

Series Editor's Preface.- Foreword.- Preface.- I. The Linguistic Veto.- 1. Philosophy as scientific theory.- a) The Hidden Dialectic of the Form and Content of Propositions.- b) The Requirement of Verification and the Relationship of Proposition and Reality.- 2. The verification problem and religious language in Wittgenstein's early work.- a) Concerning the Relationship between Propositional Reality and the Concept of the Mystical.- b) Rejecting the Claim of Truth for Religious Statements.- 3. The interpretation of religious statements as basic-propostitions and "quoque tu argument".- 4. Syntactics, semantics, and pragmatics.- 5. Philosophy as linguistic-analysis.- a) Wittgenstein's Annulment of the Linguistic Veto.- b) Linguistic Pragmatism and the Religious Language Game.- II. On the Problem of the Use of Religious Language.- 1. Rationalist criticism of the religious proposition.- 2. The three main trends in the analytical philosophy of religion.- 3. Neutrality in method and religious interest.- 4. The uniqueness of the religious use of language.- a) Anomaly of the Subject.- b) Anomalies of the Predicate.- 5. "Believing that" and "believing in".- III. Belief Without Truth.- 1. Founding the emotive turn in meaning according to Wittgenstein..- 2. The reduction theory of the religious statement.- 3. Existential participation.- 4. "Blik" and the decision for belief.- 5. The religious attitude and its justification.- a) The Psychological and Moral Understanding of Sense.- b) The Secular Understanding of Sense.- c) Sense Claim and Behavioral Practice.- IV. Belief as Truth.- 1. Foundation of the analytical theory of comprehension.- 2. The religious language game.- a) Application of Models.- b) Usage of Rules.- c) Interdependence of Different Language Games.- 3. Criteria for the religious use of language.- a) General Criteria for Intelligibleness.- b) Criteria for the Suitability of a Language System.- 4. Analogical principle.- a) The Problem of Contradiction.-b)