The Future of Economic Design / Studies in Economic Design (PDF)

¿Jean-François Laslier works at the CNRS (French National Center of Scientific Research). With a background in Mathematics, he obtained his PhD in Economics (Cnam Paris) in 1991. His research interests include Mathematical Economics, Games and Social Choice Theory, and Political Science. He does research on democracy, and in particular on voting rules and voting behavior, from the formal and from the experimental points of view. He teaches at the Paris School of Economics and publishes his work in the two fields Economics and Political Science.



Hervé Moulin received a Ph.D. in mathematics from the Université de Paris in 1975, and afterwards has taught Microeconomics in France, the USA, and currently at the University of Glasgow. His work in Mechanism Design includes the incentive properties of generalized median voting rules and of voting by successive veto; fair rules to divide an estate, workloads, or over-demanded commodities such as organs for transplant or seats for a popular event; and the exploitation of a common property technology. His most recent textbook, Fair Division and Collective Welfare (MIT Press 2003), introduces the broad contributions of microeconomic analysis to fair division problems.





M. Remzi Sanver received a PhD in Economics from Bogaziçi University in 1998. For several years, he worked as a faculty member at Istanbul Bilgi University where he was the President between 2011-2015. His research is in mathematical social sciences, with particular emphasis in the theory of social design, choice and welfare. He is the founding director of the Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies. Since October 2015, he is a director of research at CNRS, working at LAMSADE, Université Paris Dauphine.

William S. Zwicker studied Mathematics at Harvard and M.I.T., where his 1975 Ph.D. focused on logic and set theory.Since then Bill's academic career has been at Union College, where in 2006 he was named the